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CHAPTER 1    
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study 
A major problem which many countries of the world have had to contend with is the problem 
of corruption. Corruption occupies a central place among the many unresolved problems 
around the globe. This is because of its far-reaching consequences for development. 
Corruption hinders economic growth as it reduces foreign direct investment, increases 
income inequality and raises the cost of providing public services.1 On the political front, it 
undermines good governance as it weakens public institutions and damages trust and public 
confidence in the rule of law. Although corruption is a global phenomenon, developing 
countries are the worst hit by its consequences because it reduces the effectiveness of aid 
received from donor countries through diversion of funds from intended projects.2 The 
United Nations and the World Bank estimate that US $45 billion are lost annually to 
corruption thereby aggravating the incidence of poverty, disease and environmental 
destruction across the globe.3 
In spite of the wealth of discussion and consensus on the constituents of corruption, the term 
“corruption” has defied any precise definition. The World Bank has defined it as “the abuse 
of public office for private gain”.4 It has been defined also as “an illegal payment to a public 
agent to obtain a benefit that may or may not be deserved in the absence of pay-offs”;5 and as 
the promise or giving of any undue payment or other advantages in an attempt to influence 
                                                            
1 Mauro (1997: 83-87). 
2 Mauro (1997: 83-87). 
3 Moneylaundering.com News (2009). 
4 World Bank (1997: 12). 
5 Rose-Ackerman (1999: 9-10). 
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the decision of a public officer.6 Most of the definitions focus on holders of public office and 
upon bribery as a tool of corruption. However, it is recognised that public office can be 
abused also for personal benefits in the absence of bribery, through the theft of state assets, 
embezzlement or diversion of state funds and fraud.7 
One of the measures developed to combat corruption and reduce its effects is the recovery of 
corruptly-acquired assets. Asset recovery has become a key policy issue in many countries 
pursuing national assets in the possession of former rulers and officials found to have 
engaged in corruption. 
The aim of this research paper is to examine the legal framework for the recovery of 
corruptly-acquired assets, with particular emphasis on the Nigerian situation. Its primary 
focus is a detailed examination of the legal mechanisms for the recovery of such assets in the 
context of international asset recovery. Despite the success of the Nigerian government in 
recovering the Abacha loot,8 siphoning off of public funds by public office holders continues, 
and charges of fraud persist against top bank executives alleged to have converted depositors’ 
funds fraudulently.  The prevailing criminal or conviction-based forfeiture mechanism in 
Nigeria appears inadequate to deal effectively with these situations. The need to enhance 
capacity through the adoption of civil or non-conviction based forfeiture laws therefore 
becomes imperative. 
1.2 Research Questions 
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) makes asset recovery a matter 
of fundamental principle and obliges States Parties to afford one another the widest measure 
                                                            
6 Shleifer and Vishny (1993: 108). 
7 World Bank (1997: 8). 
8 Daniel & Maton (2008: 63-78).  
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of co-operation and assistance in this regard.9 The Nigerian government, in response to the 
call to combat corruption, established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in 
2003 as the “designated Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in Nigeria, which is charged with 
the responsibility of co-ordinating the various institutions involved in the fight against money 
laundering and enforcement of all laws dealing with economic and financial crimes in 
Nigeria”.10 The legal instrument establishing the Commission was the Economic and 
Financial Crimes (Establishment) Act of 2002, which was subsequently repealed and 
replaced by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act of 2004. 
The latter Act, which contains extensive provisions on financial malpractices, provides only 
for criminal or conviction-based forfeiture of assets considered to be the proceeds of crimes. 
 
In search of a more effective asset recovery mechanism and in keeping with the spirit and 
letter of Article 54(1)(c) of UNCAC,11 the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
proposed an Asset Forfeiture bill which makes provision for civil or non-conviction based 
asset forfeiture.12 This bill has met with serious opposition from the legislature. The 
following questions have attracted much debate and call for consideration: 
 To what extent has civil forfeiture been effective in recovering corruptly-acquired 
assets which have been moved to a foreign state? 
 Does the adoption of a civil forfeiture mechanism constitute an infringement of the 
constitutional guarantee of the presumption of innocence and fundamental property 
rights of an accused person? 
                                                            
9  Article 51 of UNCAC. 
10 Section 1(2)(c) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2004.  
    Laws of the Federation of   Nigeria.  Cap E1 2004. 
11 Article 54(1)(c) of UNCAC requires States Parties to “consider taking such measures as may be necessary  
    to allow confiscation of such property without a criminal conviction in cases in which the offender  
    cannot be prosecuted by reason of death, flight or absence or in other appropriate cases”. 
12 Ojiabor (2010: 1). 
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 Should proceedings for civil forfeiture be initiated before or simultaneously with 
criminal proceedings?  
 Should a civil forfeiture law be applied retrospectively to recover criminal assets 
obtained prior to its enactment? 
 Is a separate statute required or can the civil forfeiture law be incorporated into 
existing legislation? 
These five questions constitute the main points of analytical discourse of this research paper. 
 
1.3 Scope of the Research Paper 
 
The thrust of this research paper is civil recovery, which is a remedial mechanism in which a 
state files a civil action in rem, against the property itself, and then proves on a 
preponderance of the evidence or balance of probabilities that the property was derived from 
or was used in furtherance of an unlawful activity.13 It does not contemplate private civil 
proceedings in which a state institutes an action in personam against a corrupt public official 
in the civil courts of the foreign jurisdiction where corruptly-acquired assets are found. Also, 
it does not cover “administrative forfeiture”, which is a non-judicial mechanism for 
uncontested non-conviction based asset recovery, in which a non-judicial officer issues a 
declaration of forfeiture.14 
1.4 Significance of the Research Paper 
A consideration of the consequences which would flow from the introduction of civil or non-
conviction based forfeiture laws into the asset recovery framework of Nigeria is of high 
significance, not only in determining the measure of future success to be recorded in the area 
                                                            
13 Cassella (2009: 41). 
14 Greenberg et al (2009: 22). 
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of asset recovery in Nigeria, but also in acting as a roadmap for other jurisdictions 
contemplating the introduction of a civil or non-conviction based asset forfeiture mechanism 
into their asset recovery framework.  
1.5 Literature Review 
Although asset recovery across borders is not novel, it is only in recent times that states have 
given consideration to more methodical asset recovery actions.15 Hence, there are relatively 
few practitioners with substantial expertise in this area. However, there is a growing crop of 
publications which deals exclusively with recovering corruptly-acquired assets. These 
publications emphasise the relevance of civil forfeiture in the fight against corruption.  
 
A popular recent work is Pieth’s Recovering Stolen Assets. This book is a collection of essays 
dealing with issues such as the challenges involved in asset recovery, asset recovery systems, 
success stories in asset recovery and technical assistance under UNCAC. The writers argue 
that without an effective framework to recover assets corruptly acquired by leaders, 
development efforts will remain impeded.  
 
Another work that takes this argument in a new direction is Young’s Civil Forfeiture of 
Criminal Property: Legal Measures for Targeting the Proceeds of Crime. It provides a 
detailed overview of the legal and practical dimensions of civil forfeiture laws, with 
particular emphasis on their application in ten diverse jurisdictions including the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America and South Africa. Young’s work covers civil 
forfeiture of all proceeds of crime with little emphasis on corruption. 
 
                                                            
15 Smith, Pieth & Jorge (2007: 3). 
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Also, Greenberg’s Stolen Asset Recovery: A Good Practices Guide for Non-Conviction Based 
Asset Forfeiture offers detailed practical guidelines necessary for successful recovery efforts. 
It features key concepts which are critical for designing and building an effective civil 
forfeiture regime. Like Young’s Civil Forfeiture of Criminal Property: Legal Measures for 
Targeting the Proceeds of Crime, it relates to civil forfeiture of the proceeds of all crimes 
without specific reference to corruption. 
 
In addition to the aforegoing, there are a number of published articles on the subject. One 
important article that succinctly demonstrates the prevailing asset forfeiture regime in Nigeria 
is Olaleye-Oruene’s Nigeria: Confiscation of the Proceeds of Corruption. Olaleye-Oruene 
specifically addresses the constraints associated with criminal forfeiture in Nigeria and 
advocates the adoption of a civil asset forfeiture mechanism. However, the article does not 
address the legal issues associated with the adoption of such a mechanism. These issues are 
set out in the research questions above and form the main points of discourse in this research 
paper.   
 
There remains areas of controversy in the field of asset recovery which touch on serious legal 
issues, such as the right against self-incrimination in a criminal case, retrospective application 
of civil recovery laws, interference with property rights and violation of the presumption of 
innocence. This research paper seeks to complement the above works by considering these 
legal issues in relation to corruption offences. 
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1.6  Research Methodology 
 
This research work will entail an analysis of the international instruments regulating asset 
recovery, particularly UNCAC, the domestic instruments on recovery of criminal assets in 
Nigeria, especially the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act of 2004, as well as a 
comparative analysis of the civil forfeiture laws of United Kingdom, the United States of 
America and South Africa. It will examine also recent case law on the subject. Secondary 
sources in the field of asset recovery such as books, articles and media publications will be 
utilised also. The methodology is desk-top research supported by internet and library 
searches. 
 
1.7  Chapter Outlines 
 
The remainder of this research paper is divided into four (4) chapters.  
 
CHAPTER 2: Legal Framework for the Recovery of Corruptly-Acquired Assets 
This chapter will present an analysis of the legal framework for asset recovery in the context 
of the following international conventions and domestic laws: 
International Instruments 
       United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) of 2005.  
 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related 
Offences (AU Convention) of 2003. 
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 Economic Community of West African Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption 
(ECOWAS Protocol) of 2001. 
 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) of 
2003. 
Domestic Legislation 
 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
 The Criminal Code Act, 1961. 
 Penal Code Law, 1959. 
 Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2003. 
 Economic and Financial Crimes (Establishment) Act, 2004. 
 Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004. 
CHAPTER 3: Processes and Mechanisms in Asset Recovery 
This chapter will examine the processes and legal mechanisms involved in the recovery of 
assets which are the proceeds of corruption, as well as the legal constraints upon said 
processes and legal mechanisms.  
Processes in Asset Recovery 
 Asset tracing; 
 Asset freezing; 
 Asset confiscation/forfeiture; and 
 Asset repatriation. 
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Legal Mechanisms for Asset Recovery 
 Criminal or Conviction-Based Asset forfeiture. 
 Civil or Non-conviction Based Asset Forfeiture. 
Policy and Legal Constraints in Recovery Efforts 
Under this heading, an overview of the legal and policy constraints involved in recovering 
corruptly-acquired assets will be undertaken and reference will be made to the inadequacy of 
relying solely on a criminal or conviction-based forfeiture mechanism, particularly in seeking 
mutual legal assistance from a foreign country in which the proceeds of corruption are 
located.   
CHAPTER 4: Issues in Civil Forfeiture  
In this chapter, the research questions posed in section 1.2 above will be examined in relation 
to the practices of other jurisdictions that have incorporated a civil forfeiture mechanism into 
their domestic laws. The relevant case law will be considered also.   
On the question of how effective civil or non-conviction based forfeiture has been in 
recovering corruptly-acquired assets which have been moved to a foreign state, reference will 
be made to the application of civil forfeiture laws in the United Kingdom, United States of 
America and South Africa.  
As to whether the adoption of a civil forfeiture mechanism constitutes an infringement of the 
constitutional guarantee of the presumption of innocence and fundamental property rights of 
an accused person, reference will be made to the English court’s decision in Walsh v United 
Kingdom and emphasis laid on the need to balance the competing interests of the state and the 
defendant.  
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As to whether proceedings for civil forfeiture should be initiated before or concurrently with 
criminal proceedings, reference will be made to the English decisions in Payton v R and 
Director of the Asset Recovery Agency v Ayodele Olusegun Olupitan & Another. 
Lastly, the question of whether a separate statute is required or whether the non-conviction 
based forfeiture laws can be incorporated into existing legislation will be examined by 
drawing inferences from other jurisdictions that have embraced civil forfeiture, as well as 
considering the consequences that will flow from either option. 
CHAPTER 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter will contain findings based on the case law examined and the comparative 
analysis done in the previous chapters. In conclusion, a civil forfeiture law which will 
complement the existing criminal forfeiture laws in Nigeria will be recommended. 
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CHAPTER 2   
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE RECOVERY OF CORRUPTLY-ACQUIRED 
ASSETS 
Several efforts have been made by the international community and governments of 
individual states to combat corruption and reduce its adverse effects through the recovery of 
corruptly-acquired assets. In recent times, asset recovery has evolved as a potent anti-
corruption tool. Holders of corruptly-acquired assets suddenly develop shivers when efforts 
are made to strike at their ill-gotten gains. On the international front, these efforts have found 
expression in a number of international instruments directed at assisting states in the fight 
against corruption. These include: 
        United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) of 2005.  
 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related 
Offences (AU Convention) of 2003.  
 Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight Against 
Corruption (ECOWAS Protocol) of 2001. 
 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) of 
2003. 
 
2.1 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)16 
UNCAC contains seventy-one articles and covers five major areas, namely, prevention, 
criminalisation, international co-operation, asset recovery and technical assistance. A ground-
breaking achievement of the Convention is its asset recovery aspect. Article 51 of UNCAC 
                                                            
16 UNCAC was adopted by the General Assembly following its resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003  
   and it entered into force on 14 December 2005. It has been signed by more than 140 countries and  
   ratified by more than 130 countries. Nigeria ratified UNCAC on 14 December, 2004.  
   See Maton & Daniel (2009: 453).  
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makes asset recovery a matter of fundamental principle and this is considered its main selling 
point by most observers.17 Chapter V of the Convention deals exclusively with asset 
recovery. However, measures relevant to asset recovery are also dealt with in other parts of 
the Convention. 
2.1.1 Articles 14 and 23: Money Laundering. 
Corruption offences are predicate offences for money laundering. The proceeds of corruption 
offences often are laundered to disguise their illegal origin. Article 14 provides for measures 
to prevent money laundering and requires that States Parties supervise and regulate financial 
institutions in order to monitor the movement of cash and negotiable instruments across 
borders. States Parties are required also to empower authorities engaged in combating money 
laundering with the means necessary to facilitate exchange of information and also to 
consider the establishment of a financial intelligence unit to serve as a national centre for the 
collation and dissemination of information relating to money-laundering.18 
Article 23 obliges States Parties to enact domestic legislation criminalising the laundering of 
corruptly-acquired assets. 
2.1.2 Article 31: Freezing and Confiscation 
States Parties are obliged to enact domestic laws establishing measures and procedures for 
the identification, tracing, freezing and confiscation of assets which are the proceeds or 
instrumentalities of crimes defined in the Convention. With respect to proceeds of crime 
which have been transformed into other property, Article 31 provides that such proceeds also 
shall be liable to freezing or seizure and confiscation. The same measure applies to proceeds 
which have been intermingled with assets acquired from legitimate sources, with the 
                                                            
17 Schultz (2007: 2). 
18 See also Article 58 of UNCAC. 
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exception that the intermingled property shall be liable to confiscation only up to the assessed 
value of the original proceeds. 
2.1.3 Articles 37 and 38: Co-operation 
Article 37 obliges States Parties to adopt measures necessary to elicit from suspects 
information required for purposes of investigation and evidence. Such measures, which are in 
the form of incentives, include mitigating punishment of suspects who have co-operated 
substantially in the investigation or prosecution of an offence or even granting immunity 
from prosecution in such circumstances. The same applies where the suspect gives such co-
operation to the competent authorities of another State Party. 
Article 38 provides for co-operation among law enforcement authorities and public officials 
in the supply of information required for evidence and investigation. 
2.1.4 Article 46: Mutual Legal Assistance  
States Parties are required to provide mutual legal assistance to one another in investigations, 
prosecutions and judicial proceedings. Article 46(3) provides, inter alia, that mutual legal 
assistance may be required for the recovery of assets under Chapter V of the Convention. 
Mutual legal assistance, as required under UNCAC, also covers transmission of information 
between states where it is believed that such information would aid investigations and 
criminal proceedings. Although UNCAC recognises that a State Party may decline to process 
a request for assistance on grounds of absence of dual criminality,19 it provides an exception  
 
                                                            
19 Dual criminality in the context of asset recovery is the principle that a request for mutual legal  
    assistance will be refused for acts alleged as crimes in the requesting state that are not defined  
    as crimes in the requested state. 
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where the assistance requested does not involve coercive action.20  
2.1.5 Article 53: Measures for Direct Recovery of Property 
States are required to ensure that appropriate measures are available to enhance direct 
recovery of assets by other States Parties through civil action. Such measures include 
compelling payment of compensation by offenders and recognition of a State Party’s claim as 
a legitimate owner of criminal assets. 
2.1.6 Articles 54 and 55: International Co-operation 
Corruptly-acquired assets are moved abroad often. Hence, States Parties are required to 
ensure that appropriate measures are available to give effect to an order of confiscation issued 
by a court of another state. A State Party may also order the confiscation of foreign criminal 
assets within its jurisdiction. The duty of States Parties with respect to international co-
operation also extends to freezing or seizure of assets.  
Article 54(1)(c) specifically provides for civil forfeiture of assets. According to its provision, 
a state is allowed to recover corruptly-acquired property without a criminal conviction where 
it lacks jurisdiction over the accused person by reason of death, flight or absence. 
In terms of Article 55, a requested State Party is required to submit a request received from 
another State Party for the confiscation of proceeds or instrumentalities of corruption crimes 
found in its territory to its competent authorities. The same applies to requests based on 
orders issued by foreign courts.21 In the same vein, a requested State Party must take 
measures to identify, trace and seize proceeds or instrumentalities of corruption crimes for the 
                                                            
20 Informal assistance which does not involve the use of coercive powers by the requested state  
    may be rendered in the absence of dual criminality. Examples include collating publicly available  
    information, taking statements from co-operative witnesses or obtaining information from  
    government departments. See Hofmeyr (2008: 139). 
21 See Articles 31 and 54 of UNCAC. 
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purpose of eventual confiscation. The provisions on requests for mutual legal assistance 
under Article 46 apply, subject to additional requirements with respect to form and content. 
2.1.7 Article 57: Return and Disposal of Assets 
A State Party is required to dispose of confiscated property to its prior legitimate owners 
pursuant to the Convention and its domestic law. In doing so, the State Party must take 
cognisance of the rights of bona fide third parties. The requested State Party may deduct 
expenses incurred in investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings leading to the return 
of the confiscated assets. Also States Parties may enter into agreements or mutually 
acceptable arrangements for final disposal of such assets.22 
2.1.8 Article 59: Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements and Arrangements 
With respect to enhancing international co-operation in all aspects covered by chapter V of 
the Convention, States Parties shall consider concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements 
or arrangements. 
2.2 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC)23 
UNTOC deals narrowly with the problem of corruption in Articles 8 and 9 while it provides 
for recovery of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crimes in Article 12. Articles 8 and 9 
impose an obligation on States Parties to criminalise all forms of corruption and establish 
measures to prevent detect and punish corruption by public officials. 
                                                            
22 There has been much debate on whether a country returning corruptly-acquired assets is entitled 
    to impose conditions or monitor the use of returned assets. On the one hand, it is argued that such  
    exercise of power over repatriated assets by the requested state is necessary to ensure that the  
    returned assets do not get into the wrong hands. Conversely, it is contended that the requesting state  
    has sovereignty which gives it the right to make decisions on how its repatriated assets would be utilised.  
    The solution lies in balancing both competing interests. For instance, Switzerland, Nigeria and  
    the World Bank entered into an agreement on the use of the returned assets in the Abacha case.  
    See Lugon-Moulin (2008: 303-304). 
23 UNTOC was adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000  
    and it entered into force on 29 September 2003.  
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Article 12, which contains provisions on seizure and confiscation of proceeds or 
instrumentalities of crime, is virtually a replica of Article 31 of UNCAC discussed above. 
However, it has been recognised that while there exists some common ground between 
organised crime and corruption, many forms of corruption do not necessarily involve 
“organised criminal groups” as defined by UNTOC.24 The problem of corruption thus covers 
a wider scope and requires a separate convention. This has found expression in UNCAC. 
2.3 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and 
Related Offences (AU Convention)25 
The AU Convention is a regional convention which relates exclusively to member states of 
the African Union.26 The Convention aims at combating corruption and addressing its 
devastating impact on the political, economic, social and cultural stability of African states.27  
In Article 1, “proceeds of corruption” is defined as “assets of any kind, corporeal or 
incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and any document or legal 
instrument evidencing title to or interests in such assets acquired as a result of an act of 
corruption”. 
Articles 16, 17 and 18 cover recovery of corruptly-acquired assets. 
2.3.1 Article 16: Seizure and Confiscation  
States Parties are obliged to enact laws that would enable the identification, freezing or 
seizure, confiscation and repatriation of the proceeds and instrumentalities of corruption. 
 
                                                            
24 UNODC (2004: 24). 
25 The AU Convention was adopted on 11 July 2003 and it entered into force on August 5, 2006.  
   U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (2007: 1).  
26 See the Preamble to the AU Convention. 
27 See the Preamble to the AU Convention. 
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2.3.2 Article 17: Bank Secrecy 
States Parties are required to adopt measures to empower its courts and other competent 
authorities to order seizure or confiscation of banking, commercial or financial documents for 
use in recovery proceedings. Bank secrecy cannot be used as a defence by unco-operative 
banks. 
2.3.3 Article 18: Co-operation and Mutual Legal Assistance 
Article 18 obliges States Parties to afford one another the greatest technical co-operation and 
assistance in dealing with requests aimed at preventing, detecting, investigating or punishing 
acts of corruption. This includes exchange of studies, research and expertise on combating 
corruption.  
Nigeria ratified the AU Convention on 26 September 2006.28 
2.4 Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight against 
Corruption (ECOWAS Protocol)29 
ECOWAS is a regional organisation formed in 1975 and comprising fifteen West African 
states. The ECOWAS Protocol was adopted to strengthen efforts in combating and 
eradicating corruption through co-operation among States Parties. The obligations of States 
Parties include the establishment of preventive measures against corruption, criminalisation 
of acts of corruption, international co-operation and follow-up mechanisms. Most 
importantly, the ECOWAS Protocol provides a framework for the seizure and confiscation of 
assets in Articles 13 and 15. 
                                                            
28 African Union (2010: 1). 
29 The ECOWAS Protocol was adopted on 21 December 2001 but is yet to come into force.  
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
Article 13 provides for the seizure and forfeiture of corruptly-acquired assets. States Parties 
are required to adopt appropriate measures to facilitate the identification, tracing and seizure 
of items for eventual forfeiture. Courts must be empowered to order the surrender or seizure 
of bank or financial documents. Bank secrecy is not a valid reason to refuse a request for 
assistance by another State Party. 
Article 15 makes provision for mutual legal assistance and law enforcement co-operation. It 
emphasises the need for bilateral or multilateral agreements among States Parties for the 
purpose of facilitating investigations, prosecutions or other judicial proceedings. Requested 
States Parties are required also to expedite action on requests submitted by competent 
authorities of requesting States Parties. 
Nigeria has been a member of ECOWAS since its inception. 
2.5 Domestic Legislation 
In Nigeria, the anti-corruption war has found expression in the establishment of anti-graft 
institutions and the enactment of a number of anti-corruption laws. The result is that Nigerian 
law on asset recovery is not contained in a single piece of legislation.30 It is worth mentioning 
at the outset that the asset forfeiture regime in Nigeria is predominantly conviction-based.31 
In other words, a criminal offence must be proved first in a court of law before corruptly-
acquired assets can be recovered. 
The applicable domestic legal instruments are: 
 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
 The Criminal Code Act, 1961. 
 Penal Code Law, 1959. 
                                                            
30 Redpath (2000: 6). 
31 Redpath (2000: 6). 
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 Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2003. 
 Economic and Financial Crimes (Establishment) Act, 2004. 
 Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004. 
2.5.1 The Constitution  
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1999 is the source of all powers, 
whether legislative, executive or judicial, and is also the source of all anti-corruption laws.32 
Its most prominent feature is its supremacy.33 The Constitution contains provisions directed 
at eradicating corruption through the power of investigation conferred on the legislature,34 
audit of public funds by the Auditor-General of the federation,35 and the Code of Conduct for 
public officers.36 Of all the mechanisms proffered by the Constitution to combat corruption, 
only the Code of Conduct contains provisions on asset recovery. Thus, in discussing the 
Constitution, preference will be given to the provisions of the Code of Conduct.  
Section 11 of the Code of Conduct obliges a public officer to submit a written declaration of 
all assets to the Code of Conduct Bureau upon assumption of office or at the end of every 
four years or term of office. Any asset acquired after declaration which is not fairly 
proportional to income is deemed to have been acquired in breach of the Code, unless the 
contrary is proved. Section 15 establishes the Code of Conduct Tribunal to deal with 
complaints of corruption against public servants for breaches of the provisions of the Code. 
                                                            
32 Ojo (1987: 81-82). 
33 Section 1 of the Constitution provides as follows: “This Constitution is supreme and its provisions  
   shall have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”  
   Thus, any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is null and void to the  
   extent of its  inconsistency. See section 1(3) of the Constitution. 
34 See sections 88 and 128 of the Constitution. 
35 See section 125 of the Constitution. 
36 Part 1 paragraphs 1-13 of the fifth schedule to the Constitution. The provisions of the Code of Conduct  
   for public officers as they appear in the Constitution are also contained in the Code of Conduct Bureau  
   and Tribunal Act Cap. 15 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
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Section 18(2)(c) vests the Code of Conduct Tribunal with the power to punish a public officer 
by means of seizure and forfeiture of assets acquired in abuse or corruption of office. Such 
seizure or forfeiture can occur only where the Tribunal has established a finding of guilt. A 
public officer may appeal as of right to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the Code 
of Conduct Tribunal.37 The tenor of the Code of Conduct constantly emphasises that breaches 
of the Code are not offences, as an officer punished under the Code may be prosecuted or 
punished also for an offence in a court of law.38 
However, the Constitution contains provisions which place limits on the prosecution of 
public officers for acts of corruption. These limits no doubt have hampered efforts to recover 
corruptly-acquired assets.  One such provision is section 308 of the Constitution which grants 
immunity from any civil or criminal proceedings during their terms of office to persons 
holding the office of President, Vice-President, Governor or Deputy-Governor against. In 
addition, chapter IV of the Constitution, which contains Fundamental Rights provisions on 
due process, requires that in criminal cases the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt, in the absence of which he is presumed innocent.39 This is used constantly 
as a shield by persons accused of acts of corruption. 
2.5.2 The Criminal and Penal Codes 
The history of anti-corruption law in Nigeria can be traced to the Criminal and Penal Codes. 
These are the two main codes dealing with crimes.40 Both codes have been described as 
                                                            
37 Section 18(2) of the Code of Conduct. 
38 Section 18(6) of the Code of Conduct. 
39 Section 36(4) and (5) of the Constitution. See also Oyelowo (2007: 7). 
40 The Criminal Code applies to the states in Southern Nigeria while the Penal Code applies to  
    states in the North. See Ojukwu (2001: 3). 
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vestiges of imperialism because they were inventions of the colonial government and do not 
reflect current socio-cultural values.41 
Anti-corruption provisions are contained in sections 98, 404 and 494 of the Criminal Code.42 
The Codes criminalise bribery by public officers. However, neither the Criminal nor the 
Penal Code prescribes forfeiture of assets as punishment for corruption.43 
2.5.3 The Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 
The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act of 2004 (otherwise known as the Anti-
Corruption Act) was first enacted in 2000. The Act establishes the Independent Corrupt 
Practices and other Related Offences Commission (the Commission).44 The Act considers the 
following acts of corruption as offences: accepting gratification,45 offering a bribe to a public 
officer,46 fraudulent acquisition of assets,47 falsification of records,48 bribery relating to the 
award of contracts,49 and attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the above offences.50 The 
Act relates essentially to acts of corruption in the public sector. 
Section 47 provides for criminal forfeiture of corruptly-acquired assets. By virtue of section 
47, the court can make an order for the forfeiture of assets where, in the course of 
prosecution, the offence is proved against the accused or the court is satisfied that neither the 
accused nor a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration has title to the property. 
                                                            
41 Banire (2004: 265). 
42 Sections 115-122 of the Penal Code contains similar provisions.  
43 The punishment recognised under both codes for acts of corruption is imprisonment. 
44 Section 3(2) of the Anti-Corruption Act provides that the Commission shall be a body corporate  
    with perpetual succession and with power to sue and be sued in its own name. 
45 Section 8 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
46 Section 9 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
47 Section 13 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
48 Sections 15 and 16 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
49 Section 22 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
50 Section 26 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
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Section 48 provides narrowly for non-conviction based asset forfeiture. With respect to 
section 48, the chairman of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, in the absence of 
prosecution or conviction and within a period of twelve months from the date of seizure of 
the corruptly-acquired assets, may apply to a judge of the High Court for an order of 
forfeiture. The judge is required to publish, in the official gazette and at least two national 
newspapers, a notice of court attendance by persons with interests in the property. Such 
persons must show cause why the property should not be forfeited to the government. Section 
48(4) provides a time-bar for forfeiture applications. The application for an order of forfeiture 
must be brought within 12 months of the date of seizure, otherwise the property will be 
released to the person from whom it was seized. 
However, civil forfeiture of corruptly-acquired assets under section 48 is inexhaustive. A 
comprehensive law on civil asset forfeiture is required to capture new forms of value or 
wealth. 
2.5.4 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act (EFCC Act). 
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act of 2004 repealed the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act of 2002. The Act 
establishes the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) as the designated 
financial intelligence unit (FIU) in Nigeria, vesting it with power to co-ordinate various 
institutions involved in the fight against money laundering and in the repression of all 
financial crimes.51 The Act was adopted in response to threats by the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF)52 to blacklist Nigeria as a high-risk zone for economic and financial crimes.53 
                                                            
51 Section 1(2)(c) of the EFCC Act. 
52 The FATF is an inter-governmental body set up by a G-7 summit held in Paris in 1989, with  
    the co-operation of the European Commission, to develop and promote policies to combat  
    money laundering and terrorist financing. See Privacy International (2005). 
53 Arowolo (2006: 213). 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
The Act criminalises terrorist financing,54 retention of proceeds of criminal conduct,55 and 
acquisition and conversion of property which are the proceeds of crimes under the Act.56 The 
Act also vests the Commission with power to enforce the provisions of all laws dealing with 
economic and financial crimes, which laws include the Money Laundering Act of 2004, the 
Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act of 1995, the Failed Banks (Recovery of 
Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Act of 1994 as amended, the Banks and other 
Financial Institutions Act of 1991 as amended, the Miscellaneous Offences Act of 2004, as 
well as the Criminal and Penal Codes.57 Thus, the EFCC does not deal only with acts of 
corruption in the public sector. In recent times, it has spread its tentacles to the private sector, 
as seen in the arrest, investigation and prosecution of ex-bank directors on charges of money 
laundering and corruption.58 
In relation to recovery of corruptly-acquired assets, the EFCC Act contains more detailed 
provisions than the Anti-Corruption Act, but provides only for criminal asset forfeiture in 
sections 20 and 21. Upon conviction for an offence under the EFCC Act, all assets which are 
the proceeds or instrumentalities of such offence are liable to forfeiture to the federal 
government. Forfeiture under section 20 is ordered in addition to any other sentence imposed 
under the Act as penalty for the offence. However, prosecution often is fraught with several 
procedural hurdles which result in very long delays and frustrate the entire asset recovery 
process. 
 
                                                            
54 Section 15 of the EFCC Act. 
55 Section 17 of the EFCC Act. 
56 Section 18 of the EFCC Act. 
57 See section 7(2) of the EFCC Act. 
58 Iriekpen and Akinsuyi (2010: 5). 
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Consequently, within the last three years the EFCC has resorted to striking plea bargain deals 
with persons facing prosecution for acts of corruption.59 Section 22 provides for forfeiture of 
foreign assets held by convicted persons which are the proceeds of crimes. The Act also 
provides for forfeiture of assets which are the gross receipts obtained by commission of a 
crime under the Act, as well as forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime such as means of 
conveyance, records, negotiable instruments and real property.60 
2.5.5 Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act of 2004 
The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act of Nigeria was adopted on 24 March 2004.61 The 
Act repeals the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act of 2003 and prohibits the laundering of 
the proceeds of a crime or an illegal act.62 
It also provides penalties for offences and expands the scope of supervision of regulatory 
authorities on money laundering activities. Section 6 of the Act imposes obligations on 
financial institutions to verify customers’ details and identity. In the case of suspicious 
transactions, they are to submit written reports to appropriate authorities. The Act seeks 
extensive collaboration with such regulatory bodies as the Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria 
Customs Service, Nigeria Security and Exchange Commission, National Drug Law 
Enforcement Agency, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Corporate Affairs 
Commission and the Federal High Court.63 
                                                            
59 A plea bargain is a quasi-criminal judgment secured by mutual agreement between the accused person  
   and the prosecutor whereby the accused person pleads guilty on his own volition in exchange for  
   lesser punishment. Proponents argue that it saves the time of the court and state resources. However,  
   in Nigeria experience has shown that in many cases where plea bargaining has been employed,  
   it only amounts to a slap on the wrist for accused persons. For instance, an ex-governor who was  
   arraigned by the EFCC for looting billions of Naira while in office, was asked to pay only  
   N3.5 million in terms of a plea bargain, an amount grossly unproportional to the loot. See Onyema (2009: 3). 
60 See sections 24 and 25 of the EFCC Act. 
61 International Centre for Asset Recovery (2007: 1). 
62 Explanatory memorandum, Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004. 
63 Ameh (2004: 5). 
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The Act makes it an offence for any person to convert or transfer proceeds derived from illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances or any illegal act with the aim of 
concealing the illegal nature of the transaction.64 It is equally an offence to aid such illegal 
acts. It is also an offence for a director or an employee of a financial institution to alert the 
owner of the illicit funds of the report he is required to make or to destroy records required to 
be kept under the Act. The penalties imposed for the various offences under the Act include 
fines, imprisonment, and holding up and withdrawal of licences of corporate bodies.65 It is no 
defence that the offence was committed in a different country or place.66 It is in this regard 
that the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act of 2004 provides a tighter noose.67 
Section 18 provides for forfeiture of assets of banks and financial institutions convicted of an 
offence under the Act. The Federal High Court has the discretion to wind up such a bank or 
financial institution and forfeit all its assets to the federal government. Forfeiture in this 
respect affects all assets, legally or illegally acquired. 
The Nigerian asset recovery law is still in its budding phase. Although Nigeria has ratified 
UNCAC, it is yet to consider asset recovery as a fundamental principle of its anti-corruption 
scheme. It is expected that, with the ratification of UNCAC, domestic efforts will be directed 
at enhancing recovery of corruptly-acquired assets through civil asset forfeiture.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
64 See section 14 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004. 
65 Sections 14-17 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004. 
66 Section 14(2) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004. 
67 Chukwumerie (2006: 173-190). 
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CHAPTER 3   
PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS IN ASSET RECOVERY 
Recovering corruptly-acquired assets is often a broad and complex process. This is because 
offenders, especially in third-world countries, ensure that such assets are stashed away in 
foreign banks or concealed by way of acquiring properties in foreign countries. The reasons 
for this are obvious. Retaining the funds at home may draw the attention of investigators 
quickly as information is prone to travel fast through the rumour mills. Domestic currencies 
are also often too insecure or the offender may intend to leave the country in the future.68 
The steps involved in asset recovery may be categorised broadly into four, namely, asset 
tracing, freezing, confiscation or forfeiture, and repatriation. Although each of these steps 
presents its unique challenges, the steps are relational and inter-dependent. 
3.1 Asset Tracing 
Asset tracing involves tracking hidden assets through financial investigation. Although 
preliminary, it is an essential step forming the basis of recovery efforts. A country in which 
funds are kept will not repatriate the assets to the country of origin unless it is shown that the 
funds are the proceeds of an illegal activity.69  
Tracing corruptly-acquired assets is fast becoming an up-hill task. A country’s borders no 
longer count in cross-border cash movement, as large sums of money may be transferred 
electronically at the click of a mouse. The offender, in a bid to avoid being identified with the 
corruptly-acquired assets, launders the assets to disguise their illegal origin.70 For safe 
enjoyment of the proceeds of corruption, offenders employ a plethora of methods to create a 
                                                            
68 Pieth (2008: 4). 
69 International Centre for Asset Recovery (2009: 19). 
70 Corruption offences are considered predicate offences for money laundering. International Centre for  
   Asset Recovery (2009: 61). 
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distance between themselves and the assets, the assets and the form in which benefits are 
ultimately derived, and the mode of access to the benefits.71 Asset tracing therefore means 
“identifying assets with or from their criminal origins, through all mutations, if any, to the 
eventual form and state in which they exist at the time they are located”.72 Against this 
backdrop, an investigative process aimed at tracing the assets and collating evidence becomes 
an essential component in any asset recovery effort. Asset recovery practitioners have 
identified two ways by which evidence can be gathered. Firstly, law enforcement officials in 
the country where the act of corruption took place can open an investigation using all 
available legal authorities. Secondly, a private law firm can be retained to file a suit in the 
jurisdiction where the assets are found.73 
3.1.1 Goals of Investigation 
Since the jurisdiction in which the funds are located will require that there exist a link 
between the assets and an illegal activity, investigation aims, firstly, at connecting the asset to 
the illegal activity. This often is achieved through the collation and presentation of direct or 
circumstantial evidence.74 
Secondly, investigation seeks to provide sufficient evidence to prosecute the corrupt official 
on criminal charges of corruption and money laundering. Finally, the evidence will enable the 
country of origin to trace and identify assets that have been stolen or misappropriated.75 
 
 
 
                                                            
71 International Centre for Asset Recovery (2009: 81). 
72 International Centre for Asset Recovery (2007: 23). 
73 International Centre for Asset Recovery (2007: 49). 
74 International Centre for Asset Recovery (2007: 49). 
75 International Centre for Asset Recovery (2007: 49). 
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3.1.2 Investigation in the Country of Origin 
Upon assumption of power, a new government, desirous of recovering funds diverted by 
corrupt leaders of the predecessor regime, may embark upon an investigation. The new 
government may gain access to records of transactions which will disclose the monies that 
have been diverted or misappropriated and the methods used to achieve the diversion. Such 
records may include: 
i. records of the country’s central bank; 
ii. records of other local banks to which the central bank can gain access; 
iii. government-awarded contracts in which corruption may have played a role; and  
iv. evidence from officials lower in the hierarchy who may have assisted the leaders.76 
For instance, in Nigeria the Abubakar government, led by General Abdulsalam Abubakar set 
up a Special Investigation Panel (SIP) to conduct investigations into the acts of corruption 
that were associated with the Abacha regime. The report of the SIP reflected evidence 
gathered from the Central Bank of Nigeria. The report also described the methods used to 
launder monies from the Central Bank to foreign accounts held by offshore front companies 
belonging to the Abacha criminal organisation.77  
However, investigations often are marred by a number of factors which prevent them from 
keeping pace with the growing sophistication in the methods used to launder proceeds of 
corruption. These factors include: 
i. insufficient investigative knowledge due to the inherent secrecy of the activities and 
inadequate resource allocation to financial aspects of crime; 
                                                            
76 Daniel (2001: 1). 
77 Pieth (2008: 44). 
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ii. inadequate co-ordination and intelligence exchange between police and the revenue 
department due to legislative prohibitions on data sharing; 
iii. inadequate use of suspicious transaction reports due to a lack of resources and the 
inherent difficulty of following up many reports without contacting the account holder for 
explanation; and 
iv. Inadequate powers to detain cash of unexplained origin, other than drug money, at   
borders.78 
3.1.3 Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) in Tracing Corruptly-Acquired Assets 
As foreign countries are often the destinations of ill-gotten gains, transnational co-operation 
is required in the tracing of corruptly-acquired assets. Police-to-police enquiries which 
constitute mutual administrative assistance may be initiated to trace assets suspected of being 
in other jurisdictions. This will help a state to determine whether mutual legal assistance 
would be required to further the investigation.79 
Mutual legal assistance is the provision of assistance on a formal basis, usually in the 
collation of evidence by an authority of one country to another, based on a request for 
assistance.80 
There are two types of formal mutual legal assistance. These are: 
a.  Letters Rogatory 
This is the traditional system of MLA. They consist of formal communications from the 
judiciary of one country to another requesting the performance of an act akin to criminal 
                                                            
78 Levi (2003: 212-226).  
79 International Centre for Asset Recovery (2007: 23). 
80 International Centre for Asset Recovery (2007: 49).  
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investigation.81 They are extremely formal and usually slow. This system is out of tune with 
the sophistication of modern day money transfers. 
b. Direct Mutual Legal Assistance 
In contrast to letters rogatory, direct MLA is faster and requires less formality. Each country 
designates a central authority for direct communication, thus dispensing with intermediaries 
such as the Department of Foreign Affairs.82 Direct MLA can be achieved through: 
i. a bilateral treaty between two states;83 
ii. a multilateral treaty which may be regional or crime-specific; or 
iii. domestic legislation.84 
MLA may take the form of investigations by the requested state, provision of information to 
the requesting state based on such investigations, and freezing of assets held in the requested 
state.85 In the absence of an MLA treaty between two countries, it appears that UNCAC 
functions as a multilateral treaty for MLA, provided there is compliance with the formal 
requirements listed in UNCAC.86 
 
3.2 Asset Freezing 
To prevent dealings in corruptly-acquired assets by dissipation or transfer, provisional 
measures are adopted to preserve assets which may eventually constitute the subject of 
                                                            
81 US Department of State (2009). 
82 International Centre for Asset Recovery (2007: 120). 
83 Such a treaty exists between Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 
84 An example is Switzerland. Although previously known to be secretive about financial transactions,  
    it is now much more willing to assist by launching investigations on its own. See Daniel (2001: 2). 
85 Daniel (2001: 2). 
86 See Article 46 of UNCAC. 
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confiscation. Such provisional measures are generally in the form of freezing or seizure of 
assets.87  
A freezing order can be used to freeze assets alleged to be the proceeds of corruption until the 
determination of the case or a further order of a court.88 A freezing order is made against the 
offender in person and not his assets. The offender is prevented from dealing in the assets up 
to the maximum value of a state’s claim while he retains access to any surplus assets that 
exceeds the claim.89 It is an interim measure and does not confer any proprietary rights on the 
state over the assets.90 A freezing order only gives the state a measure of control over any 
increases in expenses in order to prevent the offender from dissipating his assets 
indiscriminately with the aim of frustrating the state’s claim. 
Third parties, such as banks who are in control of the offender’s funds, are bound by freezing 
orders and may incur stiff penalties in the event of non-compliance.91 The application for a 
freezing order often is made ex parte, that is, without notice to the offender who only receives 
notification when the order is served on him personally.92 A freezing order affects basic 
rights and, as with other interim applications, certain requirements must be satisfied by the 
applicant.93  
3.2.1 Good Arguable Case 
The state must show that it has a good arguable case, that is, a serious case to answer. In other 
words, there must be some sort of evidence that the assets are the proceeds of corruption. For 
                                                            
87 Gully-Hart (2008: 172). 
88 Greenberg et al (2009: 123). 
89 Daniel and Maton (2008: 257). 
90 International Centre for Asset Recovery (2009: 90). 
91 Daniel and Maton (2008: 257). 
92 International Centre for Asset Recovery (2009: 91). 
93 See Daniel and Maton (2008: 259-260). 
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instance, failure to declare assets by a public official when such declaration is required may 
constitute the required evidence. 
3.2.2 Real Risk of Dissipation of Assets  
The state must show also that there is a real risk that the offender would dissipate or conceal 
his assets if the freezing order is not granted. 
3.2.3 Duty of Full and Frank Disclosure 
A state must disclose fully all matters relevant to the application, including anything which is 
detrimental to its own case. Failure to do so may lead to the discharge of a freezing order and 
cost sanctions. 
3.2.4 Undertaking as to Damages 
The state must give an undertaking to compensate the offender if the court later finds out that 
the freezing order should not have been granted and where, as a result of the order, the 
alleged offender has suffered loss. 
3.2.5 Just and Convenient 
The state must also show that the order is just and convenient in all circumstances.94 In other 
words, the court must be satisfied that the likely effect of the freezing order will be to 
promote the doing of justice overall and not to work unfairly or oppressively. 
 A state must apply as early as possible for a freezing order once there is sufficient evidence 
to justify the preservation of the assets. However, a state may be compelled to move slowly 
due to lack of resources, length of time needed to conduct investigations, bureaucracy, 
ignorance of the options open to it in foreign courts and political resistance from public 
                                                            
94 International Centre for Asset Recovery (2009: 91). 
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officials.95 It is necessary that an interim order preventing dissipation of corruptly-acquired 
assets be obtained within a few hours of detection. Anything short of this will make a 
mockery not only of the recovery process but also of the entire anti-corruption scheme. 
Besides freezing based on a court order, some jurisdictions permit administrative freezing or 
internal freezing by financial institutions.96 
 
3.3 Asset Forfeiture 
As indicated above, asset freezing is a temporary measure. For permanent asset recovery, a 
judgment must be obtained through proceedings in criminal or civil law. The judgment 
operates as a forfeiture order. Asset forfeiture therefore refers to the confiscation by the state 
of assets which are considered proceeds or instrumentalities of crime.97 It is pivotal to the 
entire asset recovery process. However, there exist considerable variations in the asset 
recovery process between jurisdictions, though certain principal asset recovery procedures 
are common to both common law and civil law jurisdictions.98  
The principal asset forfeiture mechanisms are: 
i. Criminal forfeiture;  
ii. Civil forfeiture. 
                                                            
95 Daniel and Maton (2008: 260). In Nigeria, sections 28 and 34 of the EFCC Act, sections 37, 38(6) and 45 
   of the Anti-Corruption Act, as well as sections 16 and 18 of the Money laundering (Prohibition) Act  
   all provide for freezing of accounts upon investigation and report of suspicious transactions. However,  
   the need to gather sufficient evidence to link the assets with the crime often slows down the process  
   of applying for freezing orders. See Ribadu (2008: 34). 
96 For instance, France allows administrative freezing by the Financial Intelligence Unit upon receiving  
   a report of a suspicious transaction. See U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (2007:1). 
   In Switzerland, financial institutions may be mandated to freeze automatically reported transactions 
   for 5 days, pending the review of the reasonableness of the measure by a magistrate. 
97 Takahashi (1999: 431). 
98 World Bank/UNODC. (2009: 14). 
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In some situations, forfeiture may be sought through private litigation.99 
Civil forfeiture and criminal forfeiture mechanisms share certain features.100 They are both 
judicial matters requiring the institution of formal actions in court, the success of which 
culminate in court orders directing the transfer of title in the assets to the state.101 In addition, 
they share rationales.102 First, corruptly-acquired assets should be forfeited as those who 
engage in illegal activities should not be allowed to benefit from their acts. The second 
rationale is hinged on deterrence. Forfeiting corruptly-acquired assets will help send out a 
message to offenders and potential offenders that corruption does not pay. Mutual legal 
assistance applies to both mechanisms, thus making it easier and cheaper to freeze assets. 
However, remarkable differences exist between them. Each mechanism also has its 
advantages and disadvantages and neither can be used as a substitute for the other. 
 
 
 
                                                            
99 Private litigation entails the state bringing a private action in exactly the same way as a private  
    citizen would. It requires no conviction or initiation of criminal proceedings. It is appropriate in  
    situations where criminal conviction is difficult to obtain. Foreign courts can hear such proceedings  
    where the defendant lives in the country, or if the assets are within its jurisdiction or if the act of  
    corruption was committed within its jurisdiction. The plaintiff, in addition to recovery of property,  
    may be awarded damages also. The standard of proof in civil proceedings is on a balance of  
    probabilities in common law countries, while in civil law countries the standard of intimate  
    conviction  applies. The mutual legal assistance route is dispensed with in private litigation as  
    UNCAC makes no provision for it in such proceedings. Private litigation may be conducted  
    in the defendant’s absence provided the court is satisfied that he has been duly served with notice  
    of the proceedings. Where the defendant evades personal service of court process, substituted service  
    may be ordered. See Daniel and Maton (2008: 248). However, recovery of assets through the private litigation  
    route is expensive and may not be an attractive option for poor countries because the state has to bear  
    the upfront costs associated with the action. England has proved to be a suitable jurisdiction for recovery  
    of assets through private litigation. Nigeria successfully recovered the sum of DEM 300 million in  
    connection with the Ajaokuta steel plant buy-back scam involving the late Sani Abacha through private  
    civil proceedings. See Attorney-General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria v  Australia and  
    NewZealand Banking Group and others 1999 folio 831 QBD Commercial Court. Judgment of  
    27 February 2001. See also Monfrini (2008: 46). 
100 Cassella (2009: 37). 
101 Cassella (2009: 37). 
102 Greenberg et al (2009: 13). 
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3.3.1 Criminal Forfeiture 
Criminal forfeiture involves an in personam action against the defendant and constitutes part 
of the criminal charge.103 Thus, it is unavailable where the defendant is absent by reason of 
death, elopement or immunity. Cases usually are instituted by public prosecutors in the 
country where the crime was committed and temporary freezing orders may be obtained 
pending judgment. It is imposed as part of the sentence in a criminal case.104 Criminal 
forfeiture requires a conviction for the underlying offence. In common law countries, the 
guilt of the defendant must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, while in civil law countries 
the court must be intimately convinced of the defendant’s guilt.105 Criminal forfeiture may be 
object-based or value-based.106 The defendant forfeits his interest in the assets as his 
ownership of the assets becomes irrelevant once an order of forfeiture is granted.107  
3.3.1.1 Advantages of Criminal Forfeiture 
Asset recovery through the criminal forfeiture route has several advantages. Firstly, a single 
proceeding takes care of the forfeiture of the defendant’s interest in the tainted assets.108 
Criminal forfeiture enables the court to treat forfeiture as part of the sentencing process in a 
criminal trial and thus helps to save time and resources. 
                                                            
103 Waterloo Distilling Corp. v United States 282 U.S 577, 581, 51 S.Ct 282, 75 L.ED 558 (1931). The court  
     in distinguishing criminal forfeiture from civil forfeiture, held that in criminal forfeiture proceedings it  
     is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against, convicted and punished. See also, 
     Origet v United States, 125 U.S 240, 245-247, 8 S.Ct. 846, 31 L.Ed 743. 
104 Cassella (2008: 9). 
105 World Bank/UNODC. (2009: 15). 
106 World Bank/UNODC (2009: 14). The term “object-based” implies that the prosecuting  
     authority must show that the assets are the proceeds or instrumentalities of corruption while  
     the term “value-based” means that the offender would be required to forfeit the value of the  
     benefit accruing from the crime without proof of connection between the crime and the assets. 
107 Cassella (2009: 39). 
108 Cassella (2009: 39). 
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Secondly, the court can order the payment of a money judgment or forfeiture of substitute 
assets.109 This is possible because criminal forfeiture may be object-based or value-based, in 
contrast to civil forfeiture in which the order of forfeiture must relate to the specific assets. 
Thus, where the defendant has dissipated the specific assets, a criminal forfeiture order is 
enforceable against substitute assets. Convicted co-defendants are liable equally for satisfying 
any money judgment of forfeiture.110 
In addition, time limits do not exist for filing an indictment following seizure of property.111 
3.3.1.2 Disadvantages of Criminal Forfeiture 
One disadvantage of criminal forfeiture is its requirement of a criminal conviction. Thus, 
criminal forfeiture is impossible where the defendant is dead, has eloped or where, in the 
interests of justice, the government has decided not to prosecute. However, Article 54(1)(c) 
of UNCAC envisages the above circumstances and requires states to take other necessary 
measures to allow forfeiture of assets without a criminal conviction. Such measures include 
civil forfeiture. 
In addition, criminal forfeiture excludes the property of bona fide third parties. Thus, property 
belonging to a third party cannot be forfeited criminally. The forfeiture will be declared null 
and void where a third party establishes that he was the true owner of the property at the time 
of the crime or acquired it later as a bona fide purchaser for value.112 Thus, assets held in the 
names of foreign companies and trusts may not be subject to criminal forfeiture. 
Also, it is often difficult to obtain domestic convictions and enforceable forfeiture orders 
because of the bad influence of defendants who may want to challenge the proceedings, even 
                                                            
109 Cassella (2009: 48). 
110 Lee (2004: 276). 
111 Cassella (2009: 48). 
112 Cassella (2009: 49). 
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when a defence is obviously unsustainable. This results in adjournments and appeals which 
unduly lengthen the span of criminal proceedings.113  
It is also more difficult to prove a criminal case beyond reasonable doubt than it is to prove a 
case on the balance of probabilities in civil actions.114 The higher standard of proof required 
in criminal cases is a disadvantage of seeking recovery of corruptly-acquired assets through 
criminal forfeiture. 
3.3.2 Civil Forfeiture  
Civil forfeiture of assets is by no means a recent phenomenon. Its origins have been traced to 
the biblical Old Testament and medieval history.115 Traditionally, and for the most part of the 
nineteenth century, civil forfeiture was limited to violations of customs and admiralty law 
under the English Navigation and Trade Acts.116 It was used often as a remedy in situations 
where the court lacked personal jurisdiction over owners of the property which are the subject 
of forfeiture. With time, its application was extended to combating organised crime, 
especially in relation to the enforcement of laws on the possession or sale of controlled 
substances and drug trafficking.117 
Today, civil forfeiture has gained ground through the global proliferation of civil forfeiture 
laws and has been applied mostly in cases where criminal forfeiture has proved impossible. 
                                                            
113 Guidance Note (2007: 10). 
114 Guidance Note (2007: 11). 
115 Verse 28 of the 21st Chapter of Exodus requires that the owner of an ox be deprived of his rights  
     of ownership where the ox gores someone to death. Similarly, the Roman Twelve Tables required  
     forfeiture of a four-footed animal which had injured anyone. The ancient Greeks also banished  
     inanimate objects capable of causing death or which had caused death. Also, by the English common  
     law of Deodands, chattels which caused the death of human beings were considered “guilty objects”  
     and forfeited to the Crown. See Neill (1993: 2), Berman (1999: 25), Noyes(1995/1996: 312-313),  
     Schwarcz and Rothman (1993: 289-290) and Noya (1996: 497-499). 
116 Herpel (1998: 1916-1919). 
117 Herpel (1998:1923). See also the US Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organisations (RICO) Act  
     chapter 96 of Title 18 of the US Code, 18 USC 1961-1968; and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise  
     Act chapter 13 of Title 21 of the US Code, 21 USC 848. 
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Civil forfeiture entails an in rem action, that is, an action against the asset itself and not 
against the individual.118 It is an action distinct from the criminal proceedings and is filed 
before, during or after criminal conviction or even where there is no criminal charge against 
the individual.119 Thus, civil forfeiture does not depend on a criminal conviction. The state is 
required to show that the asset in question is tainted, either because it is the proceeds or an 
instrumentality of corruption. In contrast to criminal forfeiture, the standard of proof in civil 
forfeiture is proof on a balance of probabilities or preponderance of the evidence.120  
Civil forfeiture is object-based. Hence, forfeiture only relates to the assets and not substitutes. 
While in criminal forfeiture, the defendant forfeits his interest in the asset, civil forfeiture 
operates to forfeit the asset itself. This is because the law ascribes “to the property a certain 
personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong.”121 The burden of proof shifts to 
the owner of the property who becomes a third party and he is required to show that the 
property is “innocent”. 
Civil forfeiture is applied often in situations where criminal forfeiture is impossible or 
unavailable. These include situations: 
a. where the offender is absent by reason of death or flight;  
b. where prosecution is impossible because of the powerful influence of the offender or 
because the offender enjoys immunity from prosecution; 
                                                            
118 Greenberg et al (2009: 14). 
119 Greenberg et al (2009: 14). 
120 Cassella (2009: 41). 
121 US v  One 6.5mm Mainlicher-Carcaro military rifle, 250 F.Supp. 410 (N.D Tx.1966). In that case, the  
     court ordered the forfeiture of the rifle used in assassinating President John. F. Kennedy. See Levy (2000). 
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c. where the property is held by a third party who has not been charged with a criminal 
offence but is aware or wilfully blind to the fact that the property stems from an act of 
corruption;122 
d.   where there is insufficient evidence to sustain the charges against the offender.123 
3.3.2.1 Advantages of Civil Forfeiture 
A number of factors combine to make civil forfeiture an attractive option in recovering 
corruptly-acquired assets. 
Firstly, it is easier to discharge the burden of proof in civil forfeiture than it is in criminal 
forfeiture cases. This is because standard of proof is proof on a balance of probabilities or 
preponderance of the evidence, as against the onerous burden of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt required in criminal cases. 
Secondly, the state need not go through the lengthy process of securing a criminal conviction 
against the offender. Thus, civil forfeiture is a potent weapon in cases where prosecution is 
not feasible, such as where the defendant is absent due to death or flight or is immune from 
prosecution. With civil forfeiture, there is less work for the prosecutor. 
Civil forfeiture actions, unlike criminal forfeiture actions, can be brought against any 
property which is either the proceeds of or derived from a course of corrupt conduct. In other 
words, it is not limited to property related to a particular transaction.124 
While criminal forfeiture does not affect property held by third parties, civil forfeiture can 
forfeit the property of a third party who has no bona fide defence. Thus, once the state shows 
that the asset is tainted and proper notice of the forfeiture has been given to all interested 
                                                            
122 Greenberg et al (2009: 15). 
123 Greenberg et al (2009: 15). 
124 Cassella (2009: 44-45). 
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parties, an order of forfeiture may be issued regardless of who the owner of the property 
might be.125 Moreover, since proceedings are civil, the law can be made retrospective to 
recover ill-gotten assets acquired prior to its enactment. 
The Nigerian government has lost several chances of recovering corruptly-acquired assets 
found within its territory because of its failure to take advantage of the attractions of the civil 
forfeiture mechanism. The most notable scenario was the case of Lucky Igbinedion, ex-
governor of Edo state. In that case, criminal action was instituted against the ex-governor for 
offences of corruption, money laundering and embezzlement. However, due to insufficient 
evidence to sustain the requisite convictions that would lead to criminal forfeiture of his 
assets, plea bargain arrangements were made which resulted in the imposition of a fine. The 
fine imposed was ridiculously far below the embezzled sum which ran into billions of 
naira.126 Much of the assets would have been recovered had there been a civil forfeiture law 
in place. 
3.3.2.2 Disadvantages of Civil Forfeiture 
Civil forfeiture is not without its shortcomings. To begin with, civil forfeiture is limited to the 
property directly traceable to the underlying criminal offence. Thus, the court will not order 
the forfeiture of substitute assets or make a money judgment.127  
Civil forfeiture follows essentially the rules of civil procedure. Hence, statute of limitations 
may be a defence. For instance, the US asset forfeiture law requires the filing of a complaint 
within 90 days where the property has been seized initially for the purpose of civil 
forfeiture.128 Non-compliance renders the action time-barred. 
                                                            
125 Cassella (2009: 44-45). 
126 Adepegba (2010: 5). 
127 Cassella (2002: 2). 
128 Cassella (2009: 46). See also 18 USC 983(a)(3). 
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Civil action for forfeiture of assets may interfere with criminal prosecution or trial. Unless a 
stay of proceedings is ordered in the civil case, the claimants who are also defendants in a 
concurrent criminal case stand the chance of having access to government evidence and 
witnesses.129 
3.3.3 Concepts in Civil Forfeiture 
To aid the understanding of civil asset forfeiture as a mechanism for recovery of corruptly-
acquired assets, Greenberg et al identify certain key concepts associated with civil asset 
forfeiture.130 Some of these are outlined below. 
3.3.3.1  Civil forfeiture as Complement to Criminal Prosecution.  
Criminal prosecution, when available, remains the standard legal response in corruption 
cases. Substituting criminal prosecution for civil actions in recovery proceedings not only 
will undermine the effectiveness of criminal law but also will result in loss of confidence in 
law enforcement. The penal and deterrent effects of criminal prosecution on social order 
cannot be underestimated. Criminal prosecution should be pursued whenever possible to 
avoid the risk that prosecutors, courts and the public would consider asset forfeiture as 
sufficient penalty for corruption crimes. 
Civil forfeiture of assets should be complementary to criminal prosecutions and convictions. 
Thus, civil forfeiture mechanisms should be reserved for cases where criminal prosecution is 
unavailable. 
 
 
                                                            
129 Cassella (2009: 46). 
130 For a detailed discussion of the concepts, see Greenberg et.al (2009: 29-107). 
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3.3.3.2 Relationship between Civil and Criminal Proceedings 
Criminal prosecution may coincide with civil forfeiture proceedings. The law should 
anticipate such scenarios. There are two options open to jurisdictions contemplating a civil 
forfeiture regime. On the one hand, a jurisdiction may choose to invoke civil forfeiture action 
only when criminal prosecution is unavailable. On the other hand, a jurisdiction may decide 
that both civil forfeiture proceedings and criminal prosecution should run concurrently. 
Greenberg et al suggest that the latter approach is preferable, though both proceedings need 
not take place at the same time.131 A stay of proceedings in the civil forfeiture action may be 
sought until conclusion of the criminal case. In the absence of a stay of proceedings, both the 
criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture action may run concurrently, with a caveat that 
evidence or information from the asset owner cannot be used against him or her in the 
criminal prosecution. 
3.3.3.3 Impossibility or Failure of Criminal Prosecution  
The circumstances envisaged are where the offender has fled the country, is dead or enjoys 
immunity from prosecution. The view is that inability to prosecute should not hinder other 
legal mechanisms aimed at recovering the proceeds of corruption. In the same vein, official 
or diplomatic immunity, though generally recognised as a shield from criminal prosecution, 
should not constitute a shield from recovery of corruptly-acquired assets. Thus, civil 
forfeiture law must rule out immunity for assets liable to forfeiture. 
Civil forfeiture should also be available where prosecution is unsuccessful. Examples are 
where the defendant has been acquitted or cannot be prosecuted due to insufficient evidence 
to sustain a conviction. 
 
                                                            
131 Greenberg et al (2009: 29). 
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3.3.3.4 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence  
In the absence of such specificity the court may be compelled to fill in the gaps. In some 
cases, such “judicial legislation” may not represent the intention of the legislature. This 
would be counter-productive, especially in countries where corruption has eaten deep into the 
fabric of the justice system or where the judiciary is inexperienced in forfeiture matters. 
3.3.3.5 Range of Offences  
A comprehensive approach of subjecting all corruption crimes to civil forfeiture should be 
applied. This will help avoid definitional problems which may give rise to loopholes in 
recovery actions. 
 
3.4   Asset Repatriation 
This is the last step in the process of asset recovery. It involves returning the assets to the 
country from which they originated. Article 57 of UNCAC establishes the principles for the 
repatriation of corruptly-acquired assets. Article 57(3) sets out the requirements for return of 
assets. Where the assets are the proceeds of embezzlements or confiscated in accordance with 
Article 55 and on the basis of a final judgment in the requesting State Party, the assets must 
be returned to the requesting State Party. Proceeds of other corruption offences are to be 
returned on the requirement that the requesting State Party reasonably establishes prior 
ownership or the requested State Party recognises damage suffered by the requesting State 
Party as a basis for recovery. In all other cases, priority consideration must be given to 
returning the assets to the requesting State Party or to prior legitimate owners or to 
compensating the victims of the crime. 
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From the above provision it follows that, in the case of embezzled funds, the process is for 
the funds to be returned directly to the country of origin without the need for an intermittent 
act of appropriation by the state in which the funds are found. However, where the funds have 
been obtained as an illegal remuneration, as in bribery cases, confiscation or forfeiture is the 
basis of asset recovery. In some situations, states may resort to sharing the recovered 
proceeds.132 
It is noteworthy that there is no one-size-fits-all procedure for the return of corruptly-acquired 
assets. Much depends on the peculiarity of each situation as well as on pragmatic 
considerations. In cases where direct restitution is impracticable, the recovered assets may be 
used for the partial settlement of debts at a bilateral or multilateral level.133 In the alternative, 
returned assets may be used in development programmes.134 For instance, the assets 
recovered from Switzerland in the Abacha case were channelled towards execution of 
poverty-alleviation projects by the Federal Government of Nigeria.135 
3.5      Policy and Legal Constraints in Recovery Efforts 
There are a number of impediments to recovering corruptly-acquired assets. Some of these 
relate to the conditions in the victim state, while others relate to difficulties encountered in 
seeking international co-operation in recovery matters. 
3.5.1 Immunity of Politicians 
The age-long concept of immunity from prosecution for public office holders is rooted in the 
need to ensure that public office holders are able to discharge their duties for the public good 
without undue interference. Thus, an incumbent president or governor should be able to 
                                                            
132 Pieth (2008: 15-16). 
133 Gully-Hart (2008: 183). 
134 Monfrini (2008: 46). 
135 Monfrini (2008: 46). 
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discharge his official duties without fear or favour. The rationale is to protect the office of the 
politician and not the politician.136  
Section 308 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides immunity from 
civil proceedings or criminal prosecution for some public office holders during their periods 
of office. On immunity, Article 40(2) of UNCAC provides as follows: 
“Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish or 
maintain in accordance with its legal system and constitutional principles, an 
appropriate balance between any immunities or jurisdictional privileges accorded to 
its public officials for the performance of their functions and the possibility when 
necessary of effectively investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating offences 
established in accordance with this convention.” 
Thus, rather than do away with immunity, UNCAC advocates balancing competing interests 
in immunity issues and gives a wider discretion to states on the regulation of immunities of 
public office holders. 
Except for crimes under international law, customary international law recognises immunity 
from prosecution for heads of states.137 The exception does not extend to cases of corruption 
as they do not constitute crimes under international law. Hence, heads of states are immune 
from prosecution by another state for corruption offences. 
Political immunity thus serves as a serious obstacle to recovering state assets plundered by 
public office holders during their terms of office. Lord Brown-Wilkinson, espousing the 
doctrine of immunity in the Pinochet case, states as follows: 
“It is a basic principle of international law that one sovereign state (the forum state) 
does not adjudicate on the conduct of a foreign state. The foreign state is entitled to 
procedural immunity from the process of the forum state. This immunity probably 
grew from the historical immunity of the person of the monarch. In any event, such 
personal immunity of a head of state persists to the present day; a head of state is 
entitled to the same immunity as the state itself.”138 
                                                            
136 Pujas (2004: 90). 
137 Chaiken (2005: 31). See also R v Bow Street Magistrate ex parte Pinochet (No.3) 2001 1 AC 147. 
138 See R v Bow Street Magistrate ex  parte Pinochet (supra) at 210 G. 
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An interesting case in point on immunity is the case of Chief Diepreye Alamieyesiegha,139 
the former governor of Bayelsa state of Nigeria. Chief Alamieyeseigha was arrested in 
London and charged with three counts of money laundering under the Criminal Justice Act of 
1998 and the Proceeds of Crimes Act of 2002. During a search conducted in his London 
residence, a cash sum of £1million was discovered. He was remanded in custody and later 
released on bail. He thereafter challenged his arrest and prosecution on the ground that he 
enjoyed sovereign immunity from prosecution by virtue of his position as governor and chief 
executive of Bayelsa state, a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The English 
court rejected this argument on the ground that Bayelsa state, being a sub-state or a 
constituent state, enjoyed no such immunity. Consequently, the court dismissed the claim of 
Chief Alamieyeseigha. The case would have been decided otherwise had he been the 
President of Nigeria. 
3.5.2 Problems associated with seeking mutual legal assistance  
Mutual legal assistance is an important concept in recovering corruptly-acquired assets 
deposited in foreign states. This is because generally courts will have to depend on evidence 
gleaned from other cases. 
Jurisdictional differences, such as those which exist between common and civil law countries, 
often impede recovery efforts. The problem is heightened where there are no bilateral or 
multilateral treaties between the countries.140 In addition, most jurisdictions require dual 
                                                            
139 See R (on the application of Diepreye Solomon Peter Alamieyeseigha) v Crown Prosecution Service.  
     (2005) EWHC 2704 (Admin). In contrast, see Mellenger v  New Brunswick Development Corporation  
     [1971] 1WLR 604. 
140 In the more recent case of former governor James Ibori of Delta state, who was arrested in Dubai  
     by the London Metropolitan Police on charges of money laundering, the United Kingdom has  
     requested his extradition because it has an extradition treaty with the United Arab Emirates.  
     Although charges of corruption and money laundering are also pending against him in Nigeria,  
     an extradition request could not be made because Nigeria has no extradition treaty with the United  
     Arab Emirates. See Emah et al (2010: 1). 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
criminality as a pre-condition of mutual legal assistance.141 Thus, the offence for which the 
offender is charged in the requesting State Party must also constitute an offence in the 
requested State Party for co-operation to take effect. This may be a problem where new 
offences are developed.142 
Laws on mutual legal assistance often exclude fiscal, political and military affairs from legal 
assistance.143 Also, mutual legal assistance may be denied where the requesting state violates 
human rights. Furthermore, requesting States Parties have to pay attention to formal 
requirements under the law of the requested States Parties.144 Even where these hurdles have 
been crossed successfully, the processing of requests for mutual legal assistance often takes a 
long time. This may frustrate the entire recovery process. In the case of Ferdinand Marcos, it 
took the Swiss government almost five years to act on a request to transmit bank documents 
to the government of the Philippines, and in the Abacha case, it took nearly four years before 
bank documents required for evidentiary purposes were transmitted to the Nigerian 
government.145 
Obtaining mutual legal assistance also depends to a large extent on the legitimacy of the 
foreign government. A mutual legal assistance request from a radical or revolutionary 
government which succeeds a dictatorship may be turned down by the requested State Party 
unless the new government can show a plan for the integration of democratic principles.146 In 
other words, the requested State Party must have a measure of confidence and trust in the 
legal system of the requesting State Party for international co-operation to thrive. 
 
                                                            
141 Pieth (2008: 24). 
142 Hofmeyr (2008: 144). 
143 Pieth (2008: 13). 
144 An example is the language requirement. France turned down Nigeria’s request for assistance because  
     the request was in English. See U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre (2008: 3).  
145 Chaiken (2005: 35-36). 
146 Chaiken (2005: 30). 
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3.5.3 Lack of Political Will 
Political commitment to the asset recovery process in both requesting and requested States 
Parties is vital to the success of any asset recovery effort. In the requesting State Party, direct 
involvement of key government officials in the looting of state assets may hinder the asset 
recovery process. This is demonstrated often during the gathering of evidence, where it is 
foreseen that the evidence requested will expose public office holders other than those 
targeted. A lack of political will is demonstrated also where there is reluctance to legislate 
measures to enhance accountability and to promote asset recovery efforts. For instance, the 
Nigerian Civil Asset Forfeiture bill hit the rocks when, at its second reading, a majority of the 
members of the Nigerian legislature voted against it.147 This demonstrates that instead of the 
much-needed political will, decision-makers often pay only lip service to the fight against 
corruption. 
Also, a lack of political will on the part of the requesting State Party may pose a threat to 
recovering corruptly-acquired assets lodged in the territory of the requested State Party. The 
requested State Party may have little interest in recovery efforts where it derives economic 
benefits from the proceeds of corruption and money laundering activities.148 A request for 
mutual legal assistance may be turned down also if such proceedings threaten other higher 
interests of the requested State Party. The requested State Party may be reluctant to proceed 
against powerful interest groups such as banks, especially where banks are involved directly 
in facilitating the transfer of the tainted assets.149  
 
 
                                                            
147 Nzeshi (2010: 6). 
148 U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre (2008: 4).  
149 UNODC (2004: 584). 
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3.5.4 Lack of Adequate Legal Framework 
From the discussions of the different legal mechanisms available in the process of asset 
recovery, it is clear that there is no standard procedure or mechanism for recovery. Much 
depends on the peculiarities of each case and what is expected to work best in the country 
where the assets are found.150 The lack of a comprehensive legal framework is likely to 
impede the asset recovery process. 
3.5.5   Lack of Technical Capacity 
As more complex and sophisticated means of disguising and diverting corruptly-acquired 
assets are developed, recovery of assets also will require high-level technical capacity to keep 
up with the trends. Much expertise is required in conducting financial investigations, forensic 
accounting, requesting mutual legal assistance and in understanding the legal requirements of 
the requested States Parties.151 Unfortunately, there are relatively few practitioners with 
expertise in these areas. This often frustrates asset recovery efforts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
150 UNODC (2004: 584). 
151 UNODC (2004: 587). 
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CHAPTER 4     
ISSUES IN CIVIL FORFEITURE 
This chapter examines questions relating to the adoption of civil forfeiture laws. The 
questions concern the use of mutual legal assistance where assets have been moved to other 
states, the issue of retrospectivity, the impact of a civil forfeiture law on fundamental rights, 
its relationship to criminal proceedings, as well as mechanisms for its incorporation into a 
state’s asset recovery framework. 
4.1 International Co-operation in Civil Forfeiture Cases: The United Kingdom, the 
United States of America and South Africa 
Just as international co-operation applies in criminal asset forfeiture cases, it is indispensable 
in civil asset forfeiture where a victim state desires to recover corruptly-acquired assets found 
outside its territory. Mutual legal assistance exists in civil forfeiture not only in respect of 
investigation and restraint of assets but also in the foreign enforcement of confiscation orders 
obtained in the courts of the victim state.152 Mutual legal assistance is facilitated through 
bilateral treaties between countries, multilateral agreements or conventions and domestic 
legislation. Thus, where the victim state has in place a civil forfeiture law and has chosen to 
recover off-shore tainted assets, mutual legal assistance may be invoked to give effect to its 
request to restrain the assets or enforce civil forfeiture orders made by its courts.153 This is 
more cost-effective than bringing private civil proceedings in the court of the foreign state.154  
Against this backdrop, it is essential that a jurisdiction has both the capacity as a requesting 
State Party to secure a forfeiture judgment against property located outside its territory and 
                                                            
152 Chamberlain (2002: 158). 
153 Chamberlain (2002: 158). 
154 Chamberlain (2002: 158). 
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the capacity to enforce a forfeiture judgment of another country when it is the requested State 
Party.155 
Where a forfeiture order is obtained in a jurisdiction in respect of property located in another 
jurisdiction, the requested State Party needs to forward the judgment to the competent 
authority in the jurisdiction where the property is found on the basis of a legal assistance 
request seeking enforcement of the judgment.156 For foreign enforcement to take effect, it is 
required that the judgment be final, certified by a competent court in the requesting State 
Party and considered valid for execution under the domestic law of the requested State 
Party.157 
The legal assistance request must disclose the following facts:158 
i. that affected parties have been given adequate notice of the proceedings; 
ii. that affected parties were given the opportunity to participate in the proceedings; 
and  
iii. that affected parties participated but were unsuccessful or that they refused to 
participate. 
A study of selected jurisdictions159 that have incorporated civil forfeiture into their asset 
recovery framework would throw more light on how international co-operation works in 
relation to recovery of corruptly-acquired assets deposited abroad. However, it is important to 
state from the outset that there is no uniform or global civil forfeiture structure in place.160 
Hence, some jurisdictions have more robust and well-developed civil forfeiture laws than 
                                                            
155 Greenberg et al (2009: 100). 
156 Greenberg et al (2009: 101). 
157 Greenberg et al (2009: 102). 
158 Greenberg et al (2009: 102). 
159 Jurisdictions that have adopted civil forfeiture laws include the United Kingdom, the United States  
     of America, Australia, Canada and South Africa. 
160 Leong (2009: 227). 
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others, while many jurisdictions do not have them at all. This serves as a crucial factor in 
determining the measure of support available in cross-border civil forfeiture cases. 
4.1.1 The United Kingdom 
The Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) of 2002 provides for civil forfeiture of criminal assets. 
Part V of POCA essentially recognises two main streams for recovery of assets without a 
criminal conviction.161 The first stream deals with civil recovery proceedings in respect of 
property (other than cash) which has been obtained through unlawful conduct. Section 241 of 
POCA defines unlawful conduct.162 Section 242(1) defines property obtained through 
unlawful conduct as obtained “by or in return for the conduct”. This first stream procedure is 
initiated by the Asset Recovery Agency (ARA) through proceedings in the High Court.163 
Before the ARA can adopt a case for civil recovery investigations, the following criteria must 
be satisfied: 
i. The case must have been referred to it by a law enforcement agency or 
prosecution authority. 
ii. The value of the recoverable property must not be less than £10,000.164 
iii. The stolen asset must be recovered within 12 years of the theft.165 
iv. There must be evidence of criminal conduct on the balance of probabilities. 
Where there is a real risk or threat of dissipation of assets, they may be preserved by an 
application for a freezing injunction under Part 251(1)(f) of the Civil Procedure Rules or by 
                                                            
161 Leong (2009: 208). POCA 2002 applies only to England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. 
162 Unlawful conduct refers either to conduct occurring in any part of the United Kingdom which is  
     unlawful under the criminal law of that part or conduct which occurs outside the UK and which is  
     unlawful under the criminal law of the country and would have been unlawful had it occurred in a part  
     of the UK. The second leg of the provision subtly envisages dual criminality. 
163 Leong (2009: 208). The ARA is a non-prosecuting authority headed by “The Director” who is appointed  
     by the Secretary of State. Civil recovery is one function that is unique to the ARA. The ARA reviews  
     and assesses cases referred to it by law enforcement agencies before they are considered for civil  
     recovery investigations. 
164 Fortson (2003: 1). 
165 See section 288 of POCA. 
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means of a property freezing order pending conclusion of investigation.166 Where the case 
involves a substantial amount of overseas property, the ARA may apply for an interim 
receiving order (IRO).167 
The second stream deals with cash forfeiture proceedings. Such ill-gotten cash is recoverable 
in the Magistrates’ Court. POCA provides for cash seizure anywhere in the UK where there 
are reasonable grounds to suspect that the cash relates to unlawful conduct or is intended for 
use in unlawful conduct.168 
Part XI of POCA provides for international co-operation in asset freezing and recovery. 
However, because civil forfeiture mechanisms for recovery of corruptly-acquired assets do 
not exist in every jurisdiction, the effectiveness of international co-operation in civil recovery 
proceedings under POCA is limited.169 Seeking mutual legal assistance in civil forfeiture 
actions often turns out to be a lengthy and tortuous process as a higher standard of proof may 
be required since most jurisdictions are yet to adopt civil forfeiture laws. In addition, there 
are no treaties providing for assistance for such civil investigations. Only the interim receiver, 
who acts independently of the ARA, has recorded some success in seizing property from 
foreign jurisdictions by the use of powers of attorney.170 
In contrast, Ireland has a unique civil forfeiture regime which is considered more radical than 
the UK POCA model. The Irish civil forfeiture law is contained in the Proceeds of Crime 
(Amendment) Act which came into effect on 12 February 2005.171 The statute extends the 
definitions of “criminal conduct” and “property” so that the proceeds of extra-territorial 
                                                            
166 Leong (2009: 210). 
167 An IRO is “a worldwide freezing injunction prohibiting the person to whose property the order applies  
     from dealing with the property and also requiring him to repatriate property or documents abroad to  
     the UK.” The court appoints an interim receiver to establish ownership of the property, the location  
     of the property and its extent. See section 247 of POCA. See also Leong (2009: 211). 
168 Leong (2009: 211). 
169 Fortson (2003: 3). 
170 Dayman (2009: 242). 
171 McKenna and Egan (2009: 74). 
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criminality fall within its scope. In addition, it contains provisions to enhance procedures for 
international exchange of information. Most significantly, it has empowered the Irish 
Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) to assist in international asset recovery efforts through the 
introduction of an enhanced warrant which includes a pre-designed production order for the 
purposes of enforcement.172 
4.1.2 The United States of America 
The United States of America has an unrivalled system of asset forfeiture. This is because its 
forfeiture laws are considered more developed and complex than those available in other 
jurisdictions.173 As in other jurisdictions, the American civil forfeiture regime provides 
American prosecutors with a degree of flexibility to manoeuvre between the civil and 
criminal forfeiture routes.174  
The US asset forfeiture law developed over centuries. As noted by Cassella, “the procedures 
and policies that govern the application of forfeiture laws did not spring full grown from a 
single Act of Congress. Nor were the various statutes that were enacted piecemeal over many 
years accepted by the courts without scepticism and controversy”.175 However, by the late 
20th century, the focus had shifted to the use of civil forfeiture in combating drug offences.176 
The civil forfeiture system was expanded to cover other federal crimes which include 
proceeds of white collar crimes, which crimes invariably include corruption.177  
Because civil forfeiture involves filing a separate in rem action against the property itself, 
civil forfeiture cases in the US are titled after the names of the property which is the subject 
                                                            
172 Dayman (2009: 243). 
173 Fortson (2003: 3). 
174 Evans (1995: 4). 
175 Young (2009: 23). 
176 21 USC § 881(a)(6) of 1978 and 21 USC § 881(a)(7) of 1984 provided for forfeiture of proceeds  
     and instrumentalities of drug crimes. 
177 Young (2009: 28).  
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matter of the forfeiture action. Examples include United States v  Ninety-three (93) 
Firearms178 or United States v All funds on deposit in any accounts maintained in the names 
of Meza or de Castro.179 
As much as the US civil forfeiture system thrived domestically, it is only in recent times that 
consideration has been given to civil forfeiture of  proceeds of crimes committed in the US 
which are lodged abroad or the proceeds of foreign crimes lodged in the US. As Samuel 
notes, “there were no laws to facilitate the introduction of foreign bank records and other 
foreign evidence in US court proceedings especially in civil forfeiture cases”.180 The Civil 
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA) of 2000 introduced significant reforms with respect to 
international co-operation in civil asset forfeiture cases. By the Act, the Attorney-General is 
empowered to apply to a federal court for the registration and enforcement of foreign civil 
and criminal forfeiture judgments.181 Also, the assets of a person arrested abroad may be 
restrained where it is shown that the act which leads to his arrest can give rise to a civil 
forfeiture action in the US.182 
The enactment of the USA Patriot Act of 2001183 occasioned the amendment of US money 
laundering laws to cover international co-operation in civil forfeiture cases, where proceeds 
of crime have been moved outside the US or are found in the US. The list of foreign crimes 
which are predicate offences under the money laundering laws has been expanded to include 
bribery, misappropriation, theft and embezzlement of public funds by foreign officials.184  
Unfortunately, very limited success has been recorded in recovering cross-border assets using 
the civil forfeiture mechanism. This is because often the US has been denied assistance from 
                                                            
178 330 F.3d 414 (6th Cir.2003). 
179 63 F.3d 148 (1995); cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1541 (1996). 
180 Samuel (2005: 2). 
181 28 USC § 2467. 
182 28 USC § 981(b)(4). 
183 This is also known as the US Anti-terrorism Act of 2001. 
184 Samuel (2005: 3) 
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jurisdictions that are yet to introduce civil forfeiture laws into their asset recovery framework. 
However, a partial remedy exists under 28 USC § 1355(b)(2) of 1994, which vests US district 
courts with extra-territorial jurisdiction and venue over assets found outside the US. This 
provision is helpful in situations where a foreign jurisdiction cannot assist in forfeiting 
property because it has no civil forfeiture laws in place but could take other steps that could 
assist the US in forfeiting the assets under US laws.185 
The application of 28 USC § 1355(b)(2) of 1994 is well illustrated by the case of US v  All 
funds on Deposit in any accounts maintained in the names of Meza or de Castro.186 Although 
the case borders on proceeds of drug trafficking offences, it vividly demonstrates the 
application of civil forfeiture laws where proceeds of crime have moved outside the 
jurisdiction in which the crime was committed. The case concerned funds which were the 
proceeds of drug trafficking offences committed in the US by Jose Santacruz Londono (a 
drug trafficker) but lodged in a number of London bank accounts. The accounts were 
maintained in the joint names of Heriberto Castro Meza and Esperanza Rodriguez de Castro, 
Santacruz’s parents-in-law. 
Prosecution of Santacruz was initiated but proved impossible as he had left the US. 
Simultaneously, the government sought to freeze the London accounts to preserve the res till 
a conviction could be secured. A formal request for restraint of the assets was made to the 
UK Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). The CPS thereafter applied to the English High Court, 
which granted restraint orders under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act of 1986 and Drug 
Trafficking Offences Act of 1986 (Designated Countries and Territories) Order of 1990. The 
US was one of the countries listed in the 1990 Order as a country whose proceedings might 
                                                            
185 See 31 USC § 5332. Examples include seizure of the property, enforcement of US judgment or  
     repatriation of the assets. 
186 63 F.3d 148 (1995). See also 116 S.Ct. 1541 (1996). For a detailed discussion,  
     see Smith (1996: 902-909). See also Asset Recovery Agency v Virtuoso [2008] EWHC 149 (QB)  
     where the English court held that foreign evidence is admissible evidence under POCA. 
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lead to forfeiture of assets found in the UK. Therefore, the assets were restrained on the basis 
of the criminal prosecution contemplated in the US. Prosecution, however, could not proceed 
because of the death of Meza and because extradition arrangements could not be made with 
Colombia, where Santacruz was residing. 
The US government sought to recover the assets by way of civil forfeiture.  It commenced 
civil forfeiture proceedings in New York in 1993 and a warrant of arrest in rem was issued, 
commanding the US marshal to arrest the London accounts. A UK detective constable, 
pursuant to a request by the US marshal, served copies of the warrant of arrest on the London 
banks concerned. Esperanza Rodriguez (Santacruz’s mother-in-law) challenged the New 
York court’s jurisdiction over the funds in the London banks and also sought to discharge the 
restraint order. On the issue of jurisdiction, she contended that the 1986 Act and 1990 Order, 
under which the restraint orders were granted, applied only to criminal forfeiture. The 
English court, however, held that it equally applied to in rem proceedings. The civil forfeiture 
proceedings in the US court continued. The court relied heavily on 28 USC 1355 (b)(1) of 
1994 to justify the jurisdiction of the New York court over the London funds, on the ground 
that the court had constructive control of the res at the commencement of the proceedings. 
The control was derived from the fact that the English High court issued and enforced a 
restraint order on the accounts based on a request by the US government. The court also 
relied on the service of warrants of arrest on the London banks by a UK constable based on a 
request by US authorities. 
Although the basis on which the New York court assumed jurisdiction over the funds in the 
London bank accounts has been subject to criticism, the case describes how international co-
operation can be used to facilitate civil recovery of corruptly-acquired assets found outside a 
state’s borders. 
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4.1.3 South Africa 
The South African Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA) of 1998 provides for both 
criminal and civil asset forfeiture.187 For the first time in South Africa, a civil asset forfeiture 
regime targeted at the proceeds and instrumentality of crimes was established through POCA. 
The Act creates the offences of money laundering and racketeering.188 To recover corruptly-
acquired assets through the civil forfeiture route, a unit known as the Asset Forfeiture Unit189 
obtains an interim preservation order pending the determination by the court as to whether the 
assets concerned fall to be permanently forfeited to the State. As in many jurisdictions, proof 
in South African civil forfeiture proceedings is on a balance of probabilities, as against proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt required in criminal confiscation. 
With respect to international co-operation, the International Co-operation in Criminal Matters 
Act 75 of 1996 provides the framework for mutual legal assistance. Section 2 of the Act 
provides for the issue of a letter of request to a foreign state for the gathering of evidence in 
such state where investigations into a particular crime have been initiated in South Africa.190 
Conversely, section 7 deals with foreign requests for assistance in gathering evidence.  More 
importantly, Chapter 4 provides for the confiscation and transfer of proceeds of crime. Where 
a person against whom a confiscation order is made owns property in a foreign state, the 
South African court issuing the confiscation order may issue also a letter of request for the 
confiscation of the foreign assets.191 In the same vein, section 20 provides for the registration 
of foreign confiscation orders in respect of assets located in South Africa, provided that: 
i. the order is final and not subject to review or appeal; 
                                                            
187 See Chapters 5 and 6 of POCA. 
188 Racketeering is described as “the crime of continuously or repeatedly committing offences such as  
     fraud, corruption, theft and the like in an organised or planned fashion.” See Deneys Reitz Attorneys (2010). 
189 Deneys Reitz Attorneys (2010). The AFU is a unit within the South African National Prosecuting Authority.  
190 Dugard (2005: 236). 
191 See section 19 of the International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996. 
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ii. the order was made by a court having  jurisdiction; 
iii. the person against whom the order was made was given an opportunity to defend 
himself; 
iv. the person holds property in South Africa; 
v. the order cannot be satisfied in full in the requesting state; and  
vi. the order is enforceable in the requesting state. 
There is a limited number of judicial decisions reflecting the application of the International 
Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act (Co-operation Act) in trans-border civil forfeiture 
cases.192 However, it is recognised that when the South African government either makes a 
request to a foreign state for assistance or treats a request for assistance by a foreign state, it 
must act lawfully.193 In Thint Holdings (Southern African) (Pty) Ltd v  National Director of 
Public Prosecutions; Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma v  The National Director of Public 
Prosecution,194 the court had to determine, inter alia, the lawfulness of the issue of a letter of 
request, under section 2(2) of the Co-operation Act requesting the Attorney-General of 
Mauritius to transmit to the Republic of South Africa certain documents in possession of 
Mauritian authorities. These documents were intended to be used as evidence in the 
subsequent criminal trial of the applicants on charges of corruption and/or fraud arising out of 
an arms deal. Mr Jacob Zuma and the Thint companies challenged the request on the ground 
that section 2(2) was inapplicable and its application was a threat to their constitutional rights 
to a fair trial. The Constitutional Court of South Africa dismissed this contention. It held that 
the request did not amount to a denial of the right to a fair trial as no evidence could be 
tendered in the eventual trial without the applicants being given an opportunity to engage 
with and challenge such evidence. 
                                                            
192 Katz (2005). 
193 Katz (2005). See also Thatcher v  Minister of Justice and others, unreported judgment of the  
     Cape High Court, dated 24 November 2004. 
194 [2008] ZACC 14. 
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So far, the level of international co-operation which exists in civil forfeiture cases is very 
limited when compared to that which exists in criminal forfeiture cases. Hence, civil 
forfeiture has witnessed limited success in the international arena. It is expected that a greater 
level of international cooperation would be achieved in the not too distant future as more 
states incorporate civil asset forfeiture laws into their asset recovery frameworks. 
4.2 Civil Forfeiture and Fundamental Rights 
For the most part, acts of corruption constitute matters to which criminal law applies. Thus, 
embezzlement, bribery, trading in influence, concealment and laundering are commonly 
regarded as criminal offences. To safeguard the accused person from the retributive scourge 
of criminal sanctions until ascertainment of guilt, the law prescribes the observance of due 
process in judicial proceedings. By due process is meant that all legal rights of the accused 
person must be respected.  The underlying rationale stems from the fact that in the 
administration of justice, society places upon itself the entire risk of error, thus requiring the 
state to prove its case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.195 The rights which are 
contested often in civil forfeiture proceedings are the right to be presumed innocent and the 
right to property. These rights are affirmed by international and regional declarations of 
human rights.196 
Civil forfeiture of assets is considered an absurd process because it seeks to apply the 
standard of proof in civil proceedings to matters that are essentially criminal in nature. In 
many jurisdictions that have adopted civil forfeiture laws, the standard of proof in civil 
                                                            
195 Stahl (1992: 291). 
196 Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides as follows: “Everyone charged with  
     a penal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”.  
     See also Article 6(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and  
     Fundamental Freedoms. Article 7(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights also  
     provides for the right of the accused person to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.  
     The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria reinforces this right in  section 36(5). It provides  
     that “every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is  
     proved guilty”. Sections 43 and 44 of the Constitution safeguard the citizen’s right to property. 
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forfeiture proceedings is proof on a balance of probabilities, which is lower than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt required in criminal matters.197 Thus, the state is eased of its 
burden of proving the guilt of the accused as it need only establish the unlawful conduct on a 
balance of probabilities. Anyone laying claim to the tainted assets in a corruption case is 
required to prove absence of corruption. This reversal of the burden of proof has been 
criticised severely and contested as being contrary to the fundamental right to be presumed 
innocent. It is for this reason that civil forfeiture is referred to ironically as “criminal 
forfeiture dressed up in sheep’s clothing”.198 However, with the rate at which corruption is 
perpetrated and the increasing sophistication of mechanisms adopted to conceal corruptly-
acquired funds and frustrate attempts at criminal proceedings, it is imperative to render laws 
enforceable by relying on circumstantial evidence.199 The difficulty lies in striking a balance 
between the defendant’s fundamental right to a fair hearing, which includes the presumption 
of innocence, and the state’s desire to combat corrupt practices.200 This difficulty is 
aggravated by the failure of international human rights treaties and national constitutions to 
prescribe procedural and substantive norms applicable in civil forfeiture. As noted by Young:  
“these instruments bifurcate the world of adjudication into criminal and non-criminal 
proceedings with the former given superior rights protections and the latter only 
minimal ones. In this bifurcated world, civil forfeiture sits well in neither of the two 
realms”.201 
 
In relation to property rights, civil forfeiture also places the claimant in a rather unfavourable 
position. This is because civil forfeiture actions are actions in rem, that is, actions against 
property. Thus, the property is the defendant. Any assertion of ownership by the claimant is 
                                                            
197 Kennedy (2006:139). Examples include the UK, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.  
     In most civil law jurisdictions, the standard of proof in civil forfeiture cases is proof beyond a  
     reasonable doubt or intimate conviction. Variations, however, exist from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,  
     giving rise to a few exceptions. See also Greenberg et al (2009: 17). 
198 Young (2004: 4). 
199 Jayawickrama (2002: 23). 
200 Jayawickrama (2002: 23). 
201 Young (2009: 4). 
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met quickly with the argument that the property in itself has no constitutional rights. This 
argument is reinforced by the fact that, in civil forfeiture proceedings, the guilt of the 
property owner is irrelevant. Hence, a claim of owner’s right to property will afford no 
defence.202 
In Walsh v United Kingdom,203 a case based on an action for civil recovery of the applicant’s 
assets, the applicant contended that the proceedings for recovery of his assets were not civil 
but criminal in nature and were proceedings to which the right to be presumed innocent under 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights applied.204 The European Court of 
Human Rights had to decide whether the recovery proceedings involved the determination of 
a criminal charge such as to invoke the provisions of Article 6. The court considered three 
important criteria, namely, the domestic classification of the matter, the nature of the charge 
and the penalty to which a person becomes liable. Firstly, the court found that, according to 
the UK domestic law, the recovery proceedings were regarded as civil and not criminal. 
Secondly, the purpose of the proceedings was not punitive or deterrent but to recover assets 
to which the defendant lawfully was not entitled.205 The court further confirmed that there 
was no finding of guilt of specific offences and that though the recovery order made by the 
lower court involved a huge sum (£70 250), it was not intended to be punitive.206 Having 
regard to the above findings, the European Court of Human Rights held that the proceedings, 
being civil in nature, were outside the scope of Article 6 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights. Therefore the application was declared inadmissible. 
Civil forfeiture of assets is viewed with great distrust because of the infringement of the right 
to be presumed innocent. Expressing its fear of the growing rate of civil forfeiture 
                                                            
202 Noya (1996: 495-496). 
203 [2006] EHCR 1154. 
204 Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that “everyone charged with a criminal                                
     offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”. 
205 See also Butler v United Kingdom [2002] ECHR IV. 
206 See also Porter v United Kingdom [2003] 37 EHRR CD 8. 
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applications, the United States Court of Appeals for the second circuit has recognised that, 
while Congress may have intended civil forfeiture to be a potent weapon, “it would indeed be 
a Pyrrhic victory for the country, if the government’s relentless and imaginative use of that 
weapon were to leave the constitution itself a casualty”.207 Nevertheless, judicial decisions 
have tilted in favour of strictly excluding the right to be presumed innocent and the right of 
property from civil forfeiture cases. 
This trend is justified by the need to rescue society from the alarming growth of corruption 
and conquer the ingenuity with which perpetrators conceal corruptly-acquired assets in order 
to frustrate the state’s recovery efforts. 
4.3 Relationship between Proceedings in Criminal and Civil Forfeiture 
Given that civil forfeiture arises from criminal conduct, there are situations in which criminal 
forfeiture proceedings may coincide with civil forfeiture proceedings. Thus, it is left to the 
state to define the relationship between the proceedings.208 First, the law may require that 
criminal forfeiture proceedings should remain the standard response in corruption cases, with 
civil forfeiture proceedings being initiated only where criminal prosecution has failed or is 
impossible.209 In the alternative, the law may provide for parallel or simultaneous application 
of both procedures.  
Each of these approaches comes with its pros and cons.210 Where criminal proceedings are 
concluded first, there would be no need to apply for a stay of the civil proceedings to protect 
confidential information. The defendant also cannot claim privilege against self-incrimination 
in respect of evidence already disclosed in the criminal trial. However, the disadvantage is 
that no civil remedies can be obtained until the criminal case is concluded.  
                                                            
207 United States v  Lasanta 978 F. 2d. 1300, 1305 (2d Cir. 1992). 
208 Greenberg et al (2009: 62). 
209 Greenberg et al (2009: 62). 
210 See generally Edgeworth (2004: 168-170). 
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By contrast, where civil proceedings are taken first, the state has the advantage of a lower 
standard of proof. Also, the defendant, in a bid to defend the civil proceedings vigorously,  
may waive his right against self-incrimination and give evidence which may assist the 
prosecution in a subsequent criminal prosecution. The disadvantage of civil proceedings lies 
in the fact that the asset owner may use the extensive discovery available in the civil 
proceedings to obtain information that could be used to thwart a subsequent criminal 
prosecution. 
The third approach is to conduct both proceedings concurrently. While this enables 
concurrent imposition of criminal penalties and civil sanctions, it gravely affects the 
defendant’s right against self-incrimination. The defendant may be discouraged from 
vigorously pursuing the civil proceedings to avoid incriminating himself in the criminal case. 
The right most affected is the defendant’s right against self-incrimination.211 
In Payton v R,212 the defendant was charged with a criminal offence before the Crown Court. 
Concurrently, civil proceedings were instituted in the Magistrates’ Court in respect of the 
sum of £7800 alleged to be the proceeds of the offence. In his appeal to the Court of Appeal, 
it was argued on his behalf that the civil proceedings constituted an abuse of process resulting 
in unfairness to the defendant. The defendant was caught between giving evidence on oath in 
the civil proceedings about matters which could affect his criminal trial before the trial took 
place, and refusing to give evidence which might result in forfeiture of the cash seized before 
the conclusion of the criminal trial. The court, stressing the importance of a fair trial, held 
that a defendant’s right to a fair trial should not be prejudiced by anything arising in civil 
                                                            
211 The right against self-incrimination (also known as privilege against self-incrimination) “confers  
     immunity in criminal proceedings from an obligation to provide information tending to prove one’s  
     guilt.” Thus, the defendant is not bound to give evidence that may expose him to conviction for a crime.  
     See McDougall (2008: 2). Section 36(11) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides  
     for the right to silence in criminal  proceedings as follows: “No person who is tried for a criminal  
     offence shall be compelled to give evidence at the trial.”      
212 [2006] EWCA Crim. 1226. 
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proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court and steps to prevent such abuse should be taken by law 
enforcement authorities. The court recommended effective liaison between the police acting 
in respect of the civil forfeiture proceedings and the prosecuting authority. 
However, it is noteworthy that criminal prosecution does not in itself constitute a bar to civil 
forfeiture actions. In Ayodele Olusegun Olupitan and another v Director of the Assets 
Recovery Agency,213 the Court of Appeal considered an appeal against a civil forfeiture order 
under section 5 of POCA in relation to two properties acquired as a result of mortgage fraud. 
The appeal was dismissed on the ground that a property acquired as a result of mortgage 
fraud was recoverable property within POCA. It was not necessary for the Director of the 
ARA to allege and prove a specific criminal offence. The proceedings were not the same as a 
criminal prosecution and so the Director of the ARA was not bound by any concession in the 
criminal proceedings. 
Where there exists sufficient evidence to allow criminal or civil proceedings, the popular 
view is that it is preferable to institute criminal proceedings. The UK model supports this 
approach.214 This idea has been described as a safeguard to prevent law enforcement from 
cutting corners to deprive respondents of rights available in criminal trials. 
To avoid the difficulties inherent in concurrent civil and criminal forfeiture proceedings, the 
US model provides for a stay of the civil proceedings where civil discovery will prejudice the 
government’s ability to conduct a criminal investigation or prosecution.215 A stay of civil 
proceedings may be granted also at the instance of the respondent, subject to the following 
conditions being met: 
 
                                                            
213 [2008] EWCA Civ. 104. 
214 Section 2 of the POCA. See also Kennedy (2006: 151). 
215 Kennedy (2006: 151). 
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i. He must be the subject of a related criminal investigation. 
ii. He must have standing to assert a claim in the civil forfeiture proceedings.  
iii. The continuation of the forfeiture proceedings would affect adversely his right 
against self-incrimination in the related criminal investigation.216 
From the aforegoing, it is apparent that none of the approaches is devoid of difficulties. 
Whatever approach is adopted, the state has an obligation to provide appropriate safeguards, 
through its asset forfeiture laws, to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial and to prevent 
an abuse of process. 
4.4 Retrospective Application of Civil Forfeiture Laws 
It is a general principle of law, recognised under the Constitutions of many countries of the 
world, that a crime or punishment cannot arise from an act which was not criminal or 
punishable at the time of its commission.217 Thus, it is necessary to consider whether 
deprivation of property by means of civil forfeiture contravenes this basic principle of law 
where such assets were acquired before the enactment of the civil forfeiture legislation. 
This issue has been the subject of much judicial deliberation in jurisdictions with civil 
forfeiture legislation. The courts, in most cases, have held that the rule against retrospectivity 
is not applicable in civil forfeiture proceedings because forfeiture in this regard is not 
criminal or penal but “a civil law consequence of the fact that a perpetrator or other 
beneficiaries had obtained assets from an unlawful act”.218 Thus, in US v Four Tracts of  
                                                            
216 Kennedy (2006: 151). See also 18 United States Code 981(g)(1) and (2) USA. 
217 See Section 36(8) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; Article 11b of the  
     Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 7(2) of the African Charter on Human and  
     People’s Rights. 
218 Greenberg et al (2009: 44). 
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Property on the Waters of Leiper’s Creek,219 the court held that retroactive application of 
civil asset forfeiture laws is not penal in nature because the claimant’s conduct has been 
criminal always and the claimant never had a vested right to property. Similarly, in Dassa 
Foundation v Liechtenstein,220 the European Court of Human Rights had to decide whether 
civil forfeiture legislation could be applied retroactively to forfeit proceeds of bribery without 
offending section 61 of the Liechenstein Criminal Code and Article 7 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The court held that civil forfeiture law was comparable to civil 
law restitution of unjust enrichment and retroactive application of the law would not 
constitute a penalty. 
In resolving the question of retrospectivity in corruption cases, much depends on the 
provisions of a jurisdiction’s civil forfeiture law as to a general statute of limitations on civil 
proceedings.221 While some jurisdictions allow full retrospectivity, some other jurisdictions 
allow only limited retrospectivity.222 
                                                            
219 181 F.3d 104, 1999 WL 357773 at p 3-4 (6th Cir. 1999). See also United States v  Certain Funds  
     Located at the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., 96 E 3d.20, 25-27 (2nd Cir. 1996). However, 
     in United States v  $814, 254.76 in US currency contents of Valley National Bank account no. 1500-8339  
     51 F.3d 207 63 USLW 2643, the United States Court of Appeals had a different view based on the facts  
     of the case. Here, the state sought retrospective application of 18 USC Sec 984 for the forfeiture of the  
     seized $814, 254.76 being alleged proceeds of money laundering lodged at Valley National Bank in  
    Arizona. At the time of the seizure the relevant civil forfeiture legislation was 18 USC Sec.981(a) 
    (1)(A) which required that, to be capable of forfeiture, the funds must be involved in or traceable to  
    the money laundering enterprise. The only relationship between the funds seized and the illegal  
    activity was that the tainted funds had previously passed through the same inter-bank account.  
    The account did not contain any of the money the perpetrator was given to launder or any proceeds  
    from the laundering enterprise. 18 USC section 984 permits forfeiture of money in a bank account even  
    when the money seized is not directly traceable to the laundered funds, so long as the account  
    previously  contained the funds involved in or traceable to the illegal activity. The court held that  
    section 984 attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment and therefore  
    could not be given retrospective effect. 
220 ECHR Application number 696/05 (10 July 2007). 
221 Kennedy (2006: 135-136). 
222 For instance, the Irish civil forfeiture law provides for forfeiture of proceeds of crime obtained at  
     any time, whether prior to or after the enactment of the legislation. However, the UK civil forfeiture  
     law stipulates that civil recovery proceedings must be brought within 12 years of the date when  
     the Director of Asset Recovery’s cause of action accrued, that is, the date of unlawful acquisition  
     of the original property. Section 316(3) of the UK POCA. For a detailed discussion of the  
     approaches adopted by different jurisdictions, see Kennedy (2006: 132-163). 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
 
Retrospective application of civil forfeiture laws is justifiable because perpetrators of acts of 
corruption should not be allowed to benefit from unlawful conduct on the basis of time 
elapsed. It is also important for recovering assets corruptly acquired by rulers who have been 
in power for a long time and have had ample opportunity to siphon off state funds.223 
For the purposes of certainty and to avoid loopholes in recovery efforts,224 civil forfeiture 
legislation should provide specifically that proceeds of corruption are forfeitable, irrespective 
of when the civil forfeiture law comes into force, as long as the act from which the proceeds 
are derived was criminal at the time of its commission. 
4.5 Appropriate Legislation for Civil Forfeiture 
A jurisdiction intending to adopt civil forfeiture laws must decide whether such laws are to be 
incorporated into the existing body of laws or whether a separate statute on civil forfeiture is 
required.225 For instance, Articles 70-72 of the Swiss Criminal Code contain provisions on 
civil forfeiture.226 In contrast, other jurisdictions enact separate statute dealing with civil 
forfeiture. Typical examples include the Proceeds of Crime Act of 2002 in the UK and Law 
793 of 2002 in Colombia. In South Africa, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 1998 
provides for both criminal and civil forfeiture in the same statute. It is argued that this dual 
approach makes for the creative use of the provisions of the statute in a way that best suits the 
needs of each particular case, as the statute does not stipulate when criminal, as opposed to 
civil forfeiture proceedings, must be instituted. 
                                                            
223 Greenberg et al (2009: 44). 
224 In the South African case of National Director of Public Prosecution of South Africa v Carolus  
    and others 2000 (1) SA 1127 (SCA), the state lost the chance of recovering the criminal assets  
    involved in the suit due to uncertainty with regard to the question of retrospectivity under the  
    Prevention of Organised Crime Act. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the Act could not  
    be applied retrospectively to civil forfeitures because it did not state “whether before or after  
    the commencement of the Act” in the relevant sections. This decision prompted  Parliament’s  
    amendment of the definitions of proceeds and instrumentalities to include this wording. See section  
    1 of Act 38 of 1999. 
225 Greenberg et al (2009: 22). 
226 The same applies under the Anti-Money Laundering Act of Thailand. 
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Although civil forfeiture is a potent and needed tool for law enforcement, it raises significant 
legal issues. Much of the criticisms levelled against civil forfeiture concern issues of 
fundamental rights. It is essential that the investigative means applied or the decisions taken 
to identify, trace, freeze, and confiscate assets do not violate fundamental rights.  A balance 
must be struck between the need to apply civil forfeiture of assets as a disincentive to 
corruption and the need to respect the fundamental rights of persons whose assets are targeted 
for forfeiture. 
 
Asset recovery can be a highly complex field of work especially where corruptly-acquired 
assets have been moved abroad. Currently, only few jurisdictions use civil forfeiture in 
recovering corruptly-acquired assets. This acts as a constraint upon international co-
operation. It is envisaged that international co-operation in civil forfeiture efforts will be 
strengthened as more states embrace civil forfeiture of corruptly-acquired assets. 
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CHAPTER 5    
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
Corruption continues to affect all areas of life and impede sustainable development. The 
importance of asset recovery in both national and international anti-corruption campaigns 
cannot be over-emphasised. Asset recovery is an indispensable tool in the fight against 
corruption as it helps to ameliorate the effects of corruption. Recovered assets may be 
channelled towards development projects which will help improve the living standards of 
citizens. Also, successful asset recovery efforts serve as a deterrent to others and demonstrate 
that no one, however powerful or privileged, should profit from crime. 
Traditionally, states confiscate assets only on the basis of criminal convictions. However, 
criminal forfeiture is incapable of dealing with the many vagaries of asset recovery such as  
the accused person dying, fleeing, or enjoying immunity as a result of which he cannot be 
prosecuted.  Recent years have witnessed a marked increase in the number of jurisdictions 
that are enacting legislation permitting civil forfeiture of corruptly-acquired assets. These 
jurisdictions have strengthened their asset recovery regimes by taking advantage of the many 
benefits of civil forfeiture. 
The statutory framework for asset recovery constitutes a challenge in many jurisdictions. In 
Nigeria, in spite of the tough anti-corruption instruments available, much is still left to be 
desired in the area of asset recovery. This study has identified policy and legal constraints 
associated with forfeiture of corruptly-acquired assets. Prominent among this is the lack of 
political will. This chiefly explains the refusal by the Nigerian legislature to pass into law the 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
 
Civil Asset Forfeiture bill, as a result of which Nigeria is yet to join the league of countries 
with civil forfeiture statutes.  
While it is conceded that civil forfeiture should not be a substitute for criminal prosecution, 
civil forfeiture may be the only suitable legal response to the difficult issues involved in 
dealing with politically exposed persons who enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution. 
Nigeria should take advantage of the experience of countries like the US, the UK and South 
Africa by fast-tracking its efforts at fighting corruption through the enactment of a civil 
forfeiture statute to recover corruptly-acquired assets.  
5.2 Recommendations 
It is not sufficient simply to adopt or agitate for a civil forfeiture statute. An appropriate law 
enforcement mechanism is required for the successful application of civil forfeiture laws in 
the recovery of corruptly-acquired assets. Against this backdrop, a two-pronged approach is 
proposed to enhance asset recovery measures in Nigeria. Firstly, an appropriate statute is 
required for the adoption of civil forfeiture. Secondly, there is need to establish effective law 
enforcement structures for the eventual application of the law. 
5.2.1 Finding Appropriate Legislation 
In the current absence of a civil forfeiture statute, it is essential to search through existing 
anti-corruption legislation for provisions that may be used to forfeit corruptly-acquired assets 
without the need for prosecution or conviction. Only the Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Act of 2004 makes provision for non-conviction based forfeiture of corruptly-
acquired assets. Section 48 of the Act succinctly provides that where there has been no 
prosecution or conviction for an offence under the Act, the Chairman of the Independent 
Corrupt Practices Commission may apply to a High Court judge for an order of forfeiture 
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within twelve months of the seizure of the asset. Such application must be followed by a 
publication calling on third parties with interests in such asset to attend court and defend their 
interests in the asset. An order of forfeiture may be made if the judge is satisfied that the 
property is the subject matter or an instrumentality of a corruption offence and no genuine 
third-party interest exists. However, this provision has never been utilised because the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, which is saddled with the responsibility of 
implementing the provisions of the Act, is in practice, not an independent body. Although it 
is protected legally from political interference, it is influenced often by political incentives, 
with the result that only a few high-level investigations have taken place since its 
establishment.227 In contrast, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has been more 
proactive, but its enabling law (the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act) 
contains no provision akin to Section 48 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
Act of 2004. 
 
While the future passage of the Civil Asset Forfeiture bill is awaited, it is suggested that a 
merger of the EFCC and ICPC should be effected. The statute giving effect to such merger 
should empower the newly formed body to apply the provisions of the Corrupt Practices and 
Other Related Offences Act of 2004, which includes a non-conviction based asset forfeiture 
provision. 
 
5.2.2  Specific Recommendations in Respect of a Future Forfeiture Statute 
 
A Nigerian civil forfeiture statute should include a provision to the effect that assets which 
are the proceeds of corruption acquired prior to the enactment of the statute are subject to 
                                                            
227 Thomson Reuters Foundation (2010). 
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forfeiture. This is important for the recovery of assets held by public officers who have been 
in office for a long time and have had enough opportunity to embezzle state funds. 
 
Also, the civil forfeiture statute should contain provisions protecting whistle-blowers. This is 
to enhance detection of corruption and encourage reporting of cases of corruption. It will help 
also to promote transparency in the public sector. 
 
In addition, the civil forfeiture statute should contain provisions aimed at safeguarding 
fundamental rights. This may entail including provisions which explain how a person with an 
interest in the asset can contest or object to the forfeiture action and the time within which 
such a claim must be filed. 
 
Finally, the statute should contain provisions specifying the extent to which a claimant may 
use forfeitable assets for the purposes of contesting the forfeiture action or for living 
expenses. This is to prevent wanton dissipation of assets before an order of forfeiture is 
obtained. 
 
5.3 Law enforcement 
Globalisation and technological innovation enhance the disguise and rapid transfer of 
proceeds of corruption from one jurisdiction to another. Today, success in recovering 
corruptly-acquired assets depends largely on the effectiveness of a nation’s law enforcement 
system. Asset recovery experts have suggested the creation of law enforcement structures that 
would enable seizure of assets within 24 hours. Anything short of this may frustrate recovery 
efforts as assets are capable of being dissipated rapidly before freezing orders are obtained. 
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Overly burdensome judicial procedures, lack of technical capacities in asset recovery and 
absence of co-ordination among anti-corruption agencies are factors which may pose a threat 
to recovering corruptly-acquired assets through the civil forfeiture route. Based on these and 
all other issues discussed in this text, the following structures are recommended. 
 
5.3.1 Special Courts for Corruption Cases 
Congestion in Nigerian courts, coupled with procedural technicalities, slows down the 
prosecution of corruption cases. Defendants often take advantage of these weaknesses in the 
judicial system to frustrate the asset recovery process. Ex parte orders are granted in some 
cases to restrain anti-corruption agencies from investigating certain individuals and corporate 
bodies. This provides immunity to some ex-public office holders who are under investigation, 
even when constitutional immunity is no longer available.228 
Special courts with special rules of procedure will provide efficiency and expertise in the 
prosecution of corruption cases. Special courts would entertain and hear civil forfeiture 
proceedings expeditiously without the undue technicalities of the conventional courts. 
Countries such as Kenya, Indonesia, Ghana and South Africa have resorted to the use of 
special courts in corruption cases and such courts have proved effective. 
5.3.2 Asset Forfeiture Unit 
Nigeria requires an Asset Forfeiture Unit to give teeth to the seizure and forfeiture provisions 
in its laws.  Asset Forfeiture Units are a common feature of the criminal justice system of 
countries adopting civil forfeiture laws and have been used as law enforcement tools in such 
countries. International experience has shown that the application of civil forfeiture laws on a 
                                                            
228 Waziri (2009: 3) 
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large scale requires the creation of a special unit dedicated to that purpose.229 Confiscation 
and forfeiture systems involve a complex combination of criminal and civil laws, as well as a 
range of concepts new to both criminal and civil law.230 Forfeiture specialists are required to 
build up the necessary expertise in order to ensure the effective application of the relevant 
legislation. 
In South Africa, for instance, corruption offences are among the priority crimes targeted by 
the Asset Forfeiture Unit.231 Since its establishment in 1999, the Asset Forfeiture Unit has 
recorded notable success in recovering assets linked to high-profile figures like Jacob Zuma’s 
former financial adviser, Schabir Schaik, former Nigerian state governor Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha and former owner of Wheels of Africa and Hyundai Motors distributor, 
Willie Rautenbach.232 
In the Unites States of America, the Asset Forfeiture Unit handles all civil forfeitures and 
provides advice and substantial assistance to Criminal Division attorneys with forfeiture or 
potential forfeiture issues in their criminal cases.233 The unit works on proactive criminal and 
financial investigations. It trains Criminal Division attorneys and support staff on forfeiture-
related matters to ensure that Criminal Division personnel remain current on asset forfeiture 
law and trends in order to facilitate the successful resolution of forfeiture matters. Also, it 
monitors all ancillary hearing procedures and consults with criminal prosecutors in selecting 
the best forfeiture method for recovering the proceeds of crime. In addition, the Asset 
Forfeiture Units perform traditional asset forfeiture functions, such as the collection and 
maintenance of statistical and forfeiture-related information in automated and other records 
systems. 
                                                            
229 Kempen (2006: 2).  
230 Kempen (2006: 3). 
231 Kempen (2006: 3). 
232 Global Advice Network (2010). 
233 United States Attorney’s Office (2007). 
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Experience has shown that the war against corruption can never be won on the basis of moral 
appeal. It is best fought through the instrumentality of the law. Holders of corruptly-acquired 
assets must be divested of such assets to drive home the message that crime does not pay and 
to ensure the availability of the funds for proper public purposes. The introduction of a civil 
forfeiture law into Nigeria’s asset recovery framework is thus long overdue. The prevailing 
one-sided approach to recovering corruptly-acquired assets falls short of the lofty ideals and 
principles of UNCAC and leaves a huge gap in Nigeria’s anti-corruption effort.  Its 
commitment to the fight against corruption is best demonstrated through fortification of its 
asset recovery laws.  
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